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Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists

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Status <strong>of</strong> Implementation <strong>of</strong> Recommendation FMoD published a policy letter dated April 22, 2008, that mirrored the requirements statedin MNC-I FRAGO 085, which detailed procedures for accountability <strong>of</strong> captured enemyweapons. We reviewed the MoD policy <strong>and</strong> determined that it was adequate.The MoI Assistant Deputy Minister for Infrastructure had verbally committed to provideMNC-I MoI procedures as well, although such policy had not yet been institutionalized inwritten form.MNSTC-I continues to work with MoI to issue policy that meets the intent <strong>of</strong> therecommendation. We request MNSTC-I provide a copy <strong>of</strong> any policy MoI publishes thataddresses captured enemy weapons. This recommendation remains open.We determined that improvements are needed in the implementation <strong>of</strong> the MoDcaptured enemy weapons policy at Iraqi Army depots <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>s. This issue isdiscussed in Observation 2, found in Part II <strong>of</strong> this report.Recommendations G.1.a, G.1.b, G.2.a, <strong>and</strong> G.2.bThese recommendations were classified. See the classified version <strong>of</strong> DoD IG ReportNo. SPO-2008-001, “Assessment <strong>of</strong> the Accountability <strong>of</strong> Arms <strong>and</strong> AmmunitionProvided to the <strong>Security</strong> Forces <strong>of</strong> Iraq,” July 3, 2008.Management Comments to Recommendations G.1.a, G.1.b, G.2.a, <strong>and</strong>G.2.bThe management comments to these recommendations were classified.Status <strong>of</strong> Implementation <strong>of</strong> Recommendations G.1.a, G.1.b, G.2.a,<strong>and</strong> G.2.bOur review <strong>of</strong> recently published MNSTC-I policy <strong>and</strong> procedure, as well as spot checks<strong>of</strong> serial number accountability <strong>of</strong> weapons at the U.S.-controlled Abu Ghraib warehouse,Taji NAD, <strong>and</strong> the KMTB Location Comm<strong>and</strong> indicated that the intent <strong>of</strong> theserecommendations G.1.a, G.1.b, G.2.a, <strong>and</strong> G.2.b had been met. We closed theserecommendations.Recommendation G.2.cWe recommended that the Comm<strong>and</strong>er, MNSTC-I, with advice <strong>and</strong> assistance from MoD<strong>and</strong> MoI, jointly develop formal procedures for the delivery, joint inventory, <strong>and</strong> formalh<strong>and</strong>over <strong>of</strong> U.S.-controlled arms <strong>and</strong> ammunition provided to ISF, requiring that a 100percent joint inventory <strong>of</strong> weapons (by weapons count, weapons type, <strong>and</strong> serial number)be performed with authorized ISF <strong>of</strong>ficials at the time <strong>of</strong> delivery <strong>and</strong> formal h<strong>and</strong>over toISF.13

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