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Table 7-8. Factors that promoted or discouraged evidencebasedpolicy actionAreaFactorsEconomy Externalities: Costs of harm borne by victims andsociety at large, not necessarily by those whocreated the hazards Inequalities of power and resources between riskcreators and risk bearers. Moral hazard: Future compensation payments maybe covered by insurance companies or tax payers. Cost-benefit bias towards short-term, narrowlydistributed regulatory costs versus long-term,broad societal benefits. Public research priorities on technology promotionversus anticipatory research into potentialhazards 761 Corporate dominance of research Regulatory captureSociety & institutions Low quality media reporting and opposition to“inconvenient truths” Scientific uncertainty and the “manufacture ofdoubt”. Speedy innovation versus slow science.Conservative science with methodological,intellectual, funding, reporting biases towardscaution Short-term view of politics. Conflicts of interest in research and politics Conflicts of interest within and betweengovernment departments 762 . Asymmetry of powerbetween health/environment and business/financeministries Asymmetry of power between NGOs protectinghealth and environments, and corporations orgovernments which create or enable risks Inertia and ‘willful blindness’ in science and politics “Silos” in science and governance which inhibittrans-disciplinary research and understandingCorporate Law Corporations’ legal duty is to maximize profits andgrowth for shareholders Criminal liability for CEOs etc. is very difficult toachieve even in the US where there is vicariousliability for actions of employees Mismatch between responsibility for harm atcorporate level and responsibility for reducingharm at global, national, regional, and local levelsSource: Assembled by UNEP colleagues and David Gee based on EEAreports. 7637.7.4. Factors influencing science-policy lagsWhy are there usually decades between scientific earlywarnings and effective prevention of harm? A multitude offactors has promoted and/or discouraged evidence-basedpolicy action. 764 Table 7-8 presents such economic, cultural,political and legal factors. Timely scientific information andits trusted communication to decision-makers is important,but only one of many factors which determine whetherpolicy action is taken.The risks related to the cases above were typicallyunderestimated by regulatory authorities. The safeexposure limits determined by science decreased overtime. Long-latent-period hazards lead to long delays in151preventative action. For example, in the case of asbestosexposure studies, the 20–25 years before lung cancerappeared meant it was not possible to say what the riskswere until many years after first exposure. 765 Disregardingscientific evidence of risks appeared to be a deliberatestrategy by some industry groups and think tanks toundermine precautionary or preventive decision-making insome cases. 766 For example, from the 1920s to the 1960s,the main source of information on the health impact oflead in petrol in the USA was industry and industrysponsoredresearchers. Challenges also arose from splitresponsibilities among government entities with differentviews and competing interests. 767 NGOs (e.g., in the leadcase), victim support groups and compensation campaigns(e.g., in the Minamata and asbestos cases) played a role inspurring action. Insurance companies also played a role,for example, when they declined insurance cover forasbestos workers in 1918. 768 Immediate, economic damagespurred quick action. For example, when oyster bedscollapsed in France in 1982, legislation prohibiting theapplication of TBT paints to small boats was quicklyimplemented even though the evidence on causation wasfar from certain. 769 And where the harm to humans issevere and rare, speedy action is more likely to follow. Forexample, it took only 4 cases of human cancer, 7 cases ofvaginal cancer, and 7 cases of male infertility in smallgroups to generate action on VCM, synthetic oestrogendiethylstilboestrol (DES) 770, and DBCP respectively. 771Even when policy action was slow, some stakeholders tookvoluntary action which in turn informed policy-making. Forexample, in the 1970s Johnson & Johnson took early actionto remove CFCs from their aerosols, and, in 1971,Monsanto limited the types of PCB mixtures (Aroclor) tothose containing less than 60% chlorine substitution. 772Similarly, benzene was voluntarily withdrawn fromconsumer products in the USA after it was shown that theuse of paint strippers in homes generate atmospheric levelsup to 200 ppm in a short period of time. 7737.7.5. Research uptake in policy in the humanitariansector in AfricaInternationally, whilst there has been a stronger focus onevidence over the past few years, there is room forimprovement in the quality and use of research in thehumanitarian sector 774 . A current DFID study identified thekey determinants of the humanitarian research andevaluation operating environment in East Africa. A keyfactor limiting research uptake is the minimal involvementof local actors, such as local government, researchers andcommunities, in the design and planning stage. Itundermines a sense of ownership and accountability forresponse, at both local and national levels, and so is likely