131214840-Carl-Schmitt

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tiation and a certain compromise, just as deism can be conceived as a metaphysical
compromise. 41 By contrast, Condorcet's absolute rationalism negates the division of powers
and destroys both its inherent negotiation and moderation of state powers and the
independence of the parties. To his radicalism, the complicated balancing of the American
constitution appeared subtle and difficult, a concession to the peculiarities of that land, one of
those systems "where one must enforce the laws and in consequence truth, reason and
justice," 42 and where one must sacrifice "rational legislation" to the prejudices and stupidity
of individual people. Such rationalism led to the elimination of balance and to a rational
dictatorship. Both the American constitution and Condorcet identify law with truth; but the
relative rationalism of the balance theory was limited to the legislative and logically limited
again within parliament to a merely relative truth. A balance of opinions achieved through
the contradiction and opposition of the parties can as a consequence never extend to absolute
questions of an ideology, but can only concern things that are by their nature relative and
therefore appropriate for this purpose. Contradictory oppositions eliminate parliamentarism,
and parliamentary discussion assumes a common, indisputable foundation. Neither state
power nor any kind of metaphysical conviction is allowed to appear immediately within its
sphere; everything must be negotiated in a deliberately complicated process of balancing.
Parliament is the place where one deliberates, that is, where a relative truth is achieved
through discourse, in the discussion of argument and counterargument. Just as a multiplicity
of powers is necessary for the state, so every parliamentary body needs multiple parties.
In German liberalism during the first half of the nineteenth century, these ideas were already
bound up with historical thought. Surely the balance theory, with its elasticity and mediating
capacity, could also integrate historical thought into its system. It is of great interest how the
mechanical conception of balance was developed within nineteenth-century German
liberalism in a peculiar way into a theory of organic
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