131214840-Carl-Schmitt
131214840-Carl-Schmitt
131214840-Carl-Schmitt
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Page 14<br />
geneity and is therefore rightly excluded from it. According to Rousseau this unanimity must<br />
go so far that the laws come into existence sans discussion. Even judges and parties in a suit<br />
must want the same, 37 whereby it is never even asked which of the two parties, accused or<br />
accuser, wants the same. In short, homogeneity elevated into an identity understands itself<br />
completely from itself. But if unanimity and agreement of all wills with one another is really<br />
so great, why then must another contract be concluded or even construed? A contract<br />
assumes differences and oppositions. Unanimity, just like the general will, is either there or<br />
not and it may even be, as Alfred Weber has accurately pointed out, naturally present. 38<br />
Where it exists a contract is meaningless. Where it does not exist, a contract does not help.<br />
The idea of a free contract of all with all comes from a completely different theoretical world<br />
where opposing interests, differences, and egoisms are assumed. This idea comes from<br />
liberalism. The general will as Rousseau constructs it is in truth homogeneity. That is a really<br />
consequential democracy. According to the Contrat social, the state therefore rests not on a<br />
contract but essentially on homogeneity, in spite of its title and in spite of the dominant<br />
contract theory. The democratic identity of governed and governing arises from that.<br />
The state theory of the Contrat social also proves that democracy is correctly defined as the<br />
identity of governed and governing. When it has been noticed, this definition, 39 which<br />
appears in my Politische Theologie (1922) and in the article on parliamentarism, was<br />
partially rejected and partially taken over. Here I would like to mention that while its<br />
application to contemporary state theory and its extension to a new range of identities are<br />
new, it is ultimately an ancient, one can even say classical, definition that conforms to a<br />
tradition that is for these reasons no longer well known. Because of its reference to<br />
interesting and particularly urgent consequences in public law today, Pufendorf's formulation<br />
should be quoted: 40 In a democracy, where those who command and those who obey are<br />
identical, the sovereign, that is, an assembly composed of all citizens, can change laws and<br />
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