131214840-Carl-Schmitt
131214840-Carl-Schmitt
131214840-Carl-Schmitt
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Page xlvii<br />
55. Gustav Radbruch, "Goldbilanz der Reichsverfassung," Die Gesellschaft 1 (1924),<br />
57–69.<br />
56. Ibid., 62. Compare Landauer, "Sozialismus und parlamentarisches System."<br />
57. Radbruch, "Goldbilanz," 65.<br />
58. Ibid., 65.<br />
59. Ibid., 65–66. Radbruch was not alone in thinking that the office of Reichspräsident<br />
has a special place in the constitution; see also Hugo Preuss, "Reichsverfassungsmässige<br />
Diktatur," Zeitschrift für Politik 13 (1924), 97–113. Hermann Pünder comments that<br />
"Ebert in no sense shared the view that the office of the Reichspräsident was a<br />
decoration." Pünder, Der Reichspräsident in der Weimarer Republik (Bonn &<br />
Frankfurt/M: Athenäum Verlag, 1961), 17.<br />
60. Ulrich Scheuner, "Die Anwendung des Art. 48 der Weimarer Reichsverfassung<br />
under den Präsidenten von Ebert und Hindenburg," in Ferdinand A. Hermens and<br />
Theodor Schieder, eds., Staat, Wirtschaft und Politik in der Weimarer Republik (Berlin:<br />
Duncker & Humblot, 1967), 249–286.<br />
61. Ibid. "Die Diktatur des Reichspräsident," in Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigungen<br />
der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, Heft 1 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter & Co., 1924), 63ff.<br />
62. See Scheuner, "Art. 48," 266ff.<br />
63. According to <strong>Schmitt</strong>, a "commissarial dictator" exercised power temporarily and for<br />
the purpose of restoring the already established constitutional order; a "sovereign<br />
dictator" creates a new constitutional order. See also Schwab, The Challenge of the<br />
Exception, 30–37.<br />
64. <strong>Schmitt</strong>, Die Diktatur, ix.<br />
65. <strong>Schmitt</strong>'s paper at the 1924 conference of German constitutional lawyers (see note<br />
61 above) was appended to the second edition of Die Diktatur (1927), 213–259. Hugo<br />
Preuss's view of <strong>Schmitt</strong>'s interpretation of presidential powers in article 48 was an<br />
exception among German jurists. Commenting on <strong>Schmitt</strong>'s view in a 1924 article,<br />
Preuss wrote: "This definition of the concept of dictatorship completely conforms to the<br />
essence of extraordinary power that is set out in article 48 of the Weimar constitution<br />
and given to the Reichspräsident." Preuss, "Reichsverfassungsmässige Diktatur," 101.<br />
See also Richard Grau, Die Diktaturgewalt des Reichspräsident und der<br />
Landesregierungen auf Grund des Artikel 48 der Reichsverfassung (Berlin: Liebmann,<br />
1922). Grau argued that "the Rechtsstaat cannot preserve itself when threatened from<br />
within only by the means given in the division of powers." Grau further noted that these<br />
extraordinary powers "were firmly anchored in constitutional-legal responsibility." Grau,<br />
Diktaturgewalt, 104–105.<br />
66. See Bendersky, <strong>Carl</strong> <strong>Schmitt</strong>, 145ff., and Ellen Kennedy, "Review Article, Joseph<br />
W. Bendersky, <strong>Carl</strong> <strong>Schmitt</strong>: Theorist for the Reich," History of Political Thought 4<br />
(1983) 579–589.<br />
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