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131214840-Carl-Schmitt

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Page xxxv<br />

Legal Positivism and Legitimacy<br />

The ultimate target of his political thought was the German theory of legal positivism, whose<br />

roots lay in the mid nineteenth century. The school founded by <strong>Carl</strong> Friedrich von Gerber and<br />

carried on by Paul Laband at first provided a clear and modern alternative to the historical<br />

school of law. But by the First World War the value-free perspective of German legal<br />

positivism, which separated the law from political and moral inquiry, was no longer capable<br />

of formulating questions about the legitimacy of the state and political power or a concept of<br />

justice that was relevant to the relationship of power and authority in the state. These were<br />

dismissed as metaphysical and thus unanswerable. Instead, German legal theorists developed<br />

a principle of "the normative power of the factual," first stated by Georg Meyer. Gerhard<br />

Anschütz accepted Meyer's view and provided the standard formulation of it: "The capacity<br />

to use state power is not defined through rightful inheritance [rechtsmässigen Erwerb] but<br />

through its actual possession. . . . The question of the legitimacy of state power can<br />

[certainly] be decided according to the principles of law; but the properties of state power as<br />

legitimate [can] exercise no particular legal effect. Legitimacy is not a characteristic of state<br />

power." 76 After the German revolution this legal theory was helpless even to define a change<br />

as "revolutionary." ''It demanded for its vitality," E. R. Huber has written, "neither the<br />

'permanent use' of the constitution produced by the revolution, nor its sanction through 'a<br />

sense of justice' on the part of those concerned. . . . [According to this theory] there was only<br />

one ground of validity for a revolutionary constitution that arose from the usurpation of state<br />

power: the actual possession of power." 77 Although Georg Jellinek's Allgemeine Staatslehre<br />

(1900) 78 modified this view somewhat by introducing considerations of "convictions"<br />

(Überzeugungen), these were not conceived as truly normative. Rather they were the product<br />

of an unchallenged use of power: "Customary right does not come from the national spirit<br />

[Volksgeist] that sanctions it, [or]<br />

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