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131214840-Carl-Schmitt

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Page 3<br />

thing—all these are interesting and in part also correct observations. But they do not<br />

constitute the intellectual foundations of a specifically intended institution. Parliamentarism<br />

exists today as a method of government and a political system. Just as everything else that<br />

exists and functions tolerably, it is useful—no more and no less. It counts for a great deal that<br />

even today it functions better than other untried methods, and that a minimum of order that is<br />

today actually at hand would be endangered by frivolous experiments. Every reasonable<br />

person would concede such arguments. But they do not carry weight in an argument about<br />

principles. Certainly no one would be so undemanding that he regarded an intellectual<br />

foundation or a moral truth as proven by the question, What else? 8<br />

All specifically parliamentary arrangements and norms receive their meaning first through<br />

discussion and openness. This is especially true of the fundamental principle that is still<br />

recognized constitutionally, although practically hardly still believed in today, that the<br />

representative is independent of his constituents and party; it applies to the provisions<br />

concerning freedom of speech and immunity of representatives, the openness of<br />

parliamentary proceedings, and so forth. 9 These arrangements would be unintelligible if the<br />

principle of public discussion were no longer believed in. It is not as if one could ascribe<br />

other principles retrospectively and at will to an institution, and if its hitherto existing<br />

foundations collapse, just insert any sort of substitute arguments. Certainly the same<br />

institution can serve different practical purposes and thus allow various practical<br />

justifications. There is a "heterogeneity of purposes," shifts in meanings from the practical<br />

point of view, and functional changes in practical means, but there is no heterogeneity of<br />

principles. If we assume with Montesquieu, for example, that the principle of monarchy is<br />

honor, 10 then this principle cannot be foisted onto a democratic republic any more than a<br />

monarchy could be founded on the principle of open discussion. Indeed, a feeling for the<br />

specificity of principles seems to have disappeared and an unlimited substitution to have<br />

taken its place. In the review by Thoma mentioned<br />

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