A Technical History of the SEI

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References [AFSAB 1988] Air Force Science Advisory Board (SAB). Integrated Avionics. SAB, 1988. [Cohen 1992] Cohen, Aaron. “Charting The Future: Challenges and Promises Ahead of Space Exploration” (Lecture). University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, October 28, 1992. Available through https://www.coursehero.com/file/9421167/lect17rmaexactsol/ [DoD 1991] Department of Defense. Software Technology Strategy. DoD, 1991. [Doyle 1993] Doyle, L. & Elzey, J. Successful Use of Rate Monotonic Theory on a Formidable Real-Time System. (Technical report). ITT, Aerospace Communication Division, 1993. [Jones 1997] Jones, Mike. “What Really Happened on Mars Pathfinder.” The Risks Digest 19, 49 [December 7, 1997]. http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/19.49.html#subj1 [Klein 1993] Klein, Mark. H.; Ralya, Thomas; Pollak, Bill; Obenza, Ray; & Harbour, Michael Gonzales. A Practitioner’s Handbook for Real-Time Analysis: Guide to Rate Monotonic Analysis for Real-Time Systems. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993. (ISBN 0-792393619). [Liu 1973] Liu, C. L. & Layland, J. W. “Scheduling Algorithm for Multiprogramming in a Hard Real-Time Environment.” Journal of the ACM 20, 1 (1973): 46-61. [NRC 1992] National Research Council. Computing the Future: A Broader Agenda for Computer Science and Engineering, Selected Accomplishment Section (p. 193). National Academy Press, 1992. [Sha 1984] Sha, Lui & Goodenough, John. “Generalized Rate-Monotonic Scheduling Theory: A Framework for Developing Real-Time Systems.” IEEE Proceedings 82, 1 (January 1984): 68-82. [UI 2014] University of Illinois. Cyber Physical Systems Integration Lab. http://publish.illinois.edu/cpsintegrationlab/about/history/ (2014). CMU/SEI-2016-SR-027 | SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE | CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY 39 Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
Simplex Architecture The Challenge: Ensuring the Integrity of Safety-Critical Systems Organizations rarely have the resources and technologies to make software systems flawless. Frequently, designers also have to deal with the fact that less than 15 percent of a system’s code is newly created for a particular project. Much of the legacy code has known and unknown defects. It boils down to having different grades of code in practical systems: different components come with different levels of quality and with different price tags. Furthermore, safety-critical components cannot be fully isolated. These components need to interact with less reliable and even unsafe components safely. For example, the flight control component in an autopilot is certified to DO178B Level A (the highest level). However, it needs to accept guidance commands from a flight guidance system that is only certified to Level C. Nevertheless, avionics certification requires that Level A software must still function correctly in spite of the software failures in less critical components [RCTA 1992]. In medical systems, patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) is commonly used after a major surgery. When a patient pushes a button, morphine sulfate (or similar drug) will flow into the patient’s blood stream via the infusion pump. Morphine overdoses can be fatal and, indeed, there were fatal accidents in early generations of PCAs. In this example, the PCA controller is a safety-critical component, but it needs to take commands from a patient whose actions must be assumed to be unsafe. In the first example, the Level A flight controller has to take guidance commands from the less reliable Level C flight guidance subsystem. A Solution: The Simplex Architecture The SEI developed an architecture template, called the Simplex architecture, that supports the overall safety of a system that is composed of both reliable/safe components and less reliable/less safe components [Sha 2001]. Under the Simplex architecture, a system is divided into two parts: a complex component that cannot be fully verified but is needed to provide important service, and a high-assurance control subsystem that is simple and fully verified. A Simplex architecture is designed in such a way that (1) complex components cannot corrupt or interfere with the execution of the high-assurance system and (2) the data and/or commands from the complex component will not be used unless the resulting system state can be checked in real time that it is remaining well within the safety and stability envelope. Otherwise, the safety controllers put the system into safety mode. 8 The relation between complex and simple safety controllers must be verified as well formed in the Simplex architecture. This means that the safety controller can use the service of the complex components but the system safety does not depend on the correct functioning of complex components. In short, the key principle of Simplex architecture is to use, but not depend on, the service of complex or legacy components whose correctness cannot be fully verified. This principle is 8 In automated flight control, this means letting the pilot take over. In PCA, this means stopping the morphine and alerting nurses. CMU/SEI-2016-SR-027 | SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE | CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY 40 Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
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A Technical History of the SEI Larr
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Table of Contents Foreword Preface
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The Consequence: Undergraduate Soft
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References 131 Expanding the CMMI P
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The Challenge: Configuration Suppor
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References 275 Operational Support
Page 13 and 14: Foreword Angel Jordan University Pr
Page 15 and 16: to the SEI on a part-time basis as
Page 17 and 18: Blaise Durante Deputy Assistant Sec
Page 19 and 20: synergy between the TRA team’s ob
Page 21 and 22: Preface This report chronicles the
Page 23 and 24: Abstract This report chronicles the
Page 25 and 26: 1 Introduction CMU/SEI-2016-SR-027
Page 27 and 28: Introduction In December 1984, the
Page 29 and 30: promulgate use of modern techniques
Page 31 and 32: Interpreting the Charter In creatin
Page 33 and 34: of Defense and flag officers from t
Page 35 and 36: (CRADA) funding is available to exp
Page 37 and 38: Another effective mechanism has bee
Page 39 and 40: 2 Real-Time Embedded Systems Engine
Page 41: Figure 3: Real-Time Embedded System
Page 44 and 45: Introduction to Real-Time Embedded
Page 46 and 47: in those developments. The SEI was,
Page 48 and 49: general-purpose techniques but with
Page 50 and 51: Summary DoD systems have traditiona
Page 52 and 53: Ada/Real-Time Embedded Systems Test
Page 54 and 55: enchmark. Results of testbed experi
Page 56 and 57: Distributed Ada Real-Time Kernel Th
Page 58 and 59: Ada Adoption Handbook The Challenge
Page 60 and 61: [Hefley 1992] Hefley, William; Fore
Page 62 and 63: processor utilization. The sample a
Page 66 and 67: also known as using simplicity to c
Page 68 and 69: Software for Heterogeneous Machines
Page 70 and 71: [Barbacci 1986b] Barbacci, Mario &
Page 72 and 73: The increase in processing capacity
Page 74 and 75: [Lakshmanan 2011] Lakshmanan, Karth
Page 76 and 77: analysis as well as model tuning fo
Page 78 and 79: References [Hansen 2004] Hansen, J.
Page 80 and 81: or asynchronous networked computer
Page 82 and 83: 3 Education and Training CMU/SEI-20
Page 84: Figure 4: Education and Training Ti
Page 87 and 88: making materials available to allow
Page 89 and 90: course offering, while at other uni
Page 91 and 92: [DoD 1984] Statement of Work for Im
Page 93 and 94: The curriculum guidelines also sugg
Page 95 and 96: Undergraduate Software Engineering
Page 97 and 98: SEI adapted the Personal Software P
Page 99 and 100: Software Assurance Curriculum for C
Page 101 and 102: how they relate to business needs.
Page 103 and 104: Survivability and Information Assur
Page 105 and 106: The SEI curriculum and others’ co
Page 107 and 108: The CSEE conference series also bro
Page 109 and 110: CMU Master of Software Engineering
Page 111 and 112: Executive Education Program The Cha
Page 113 and 114: Professional Training The Challenge
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Education and Training Delivery Pla
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[Ardis 2005] Ardis, Mark. “An Inc
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practical for keeping content curre
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[Johnson 2012] Johnson, Col. Rivers
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4 Management CMU/SEI-2016-SR-027 |
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Figure 5: Management Timeline CMU/S
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Introduction to Management When the
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neering CMM [SEI 1995] to describe
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under SEI stewardship in 2009. Deve
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References [Averill 1993] Averill,
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[SEI 1995] A Systems Engineering Ca
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The SEI developed a more explicit m
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[Humphrey 1988] Humphrey, Watts; Sw
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opinion leaders and senior managers
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[Hayes 1995] Hayes, William & Zubro
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move from maturity level to maturit
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The People Capability Maturity Mode
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The SEI Contribution As is the case
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and security process improvement. T
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[Caralli 2004] Caralli, Richard. Ma
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4.6.2.1 CMMI Constellations For CMM
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ity and widespread use of the CMMI
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Expanding the CMMI Product Suite to
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key leaders within that organizatio
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The Smart Grid The Challenge: The N
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ecoming more widespread. As utiliti
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Continuous Risk Management training
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[Alberts 2009] Alberts, Christopher
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The principal motivator for the dev
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References [Carleton 2010] Carleton
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Measurement and Analysis The Challe
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Carnegie Mellon University, 2002. h
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activities. The final set of activi
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[Rombach 1989] Rombach, H. Dieter &
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5 Security CMU/SEI-2016-SR-027 | SO
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Figure 6: Security Timeline CMU/SEI
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Introduction to Security In the ear
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The CERT/CC helps guard against dev
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The SEI concern about risks posed t
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Teams (FIRST), which was formed in
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[Killcrece 2008] Killcrece, Georgia
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The CERT/CC built on its vast colle
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Malicious Code Analysis The Challen
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have put advanced tools in the hand
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Secure Coding The Challenge: Preven
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end, the SEI has developed training
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Network Situational Awareness The C
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In 2007, the Comprehensive National
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study. In 2011, the DoD began fundi
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[CSO 2004] CSO Magazine, in coopera
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People who work in small organizati
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[Violino 2010] Violino, Bob. “IT
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Since its initial development in 20
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References [Alberts 2005] Alberts,
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6 Software Engineering Methods CMU/
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Introduction to Software Engineerin
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were delivered to Army and Air Forc
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Configuration Management The Challe
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The SEI Contribution The SEI recogn
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CASE Environments The Challenge: Ma
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The SEI Contribution The CASE work
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Software Technology Reference Guide
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Reengineering The Challenge: Legacy
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[Bergey 1999] Bergey, John; Smith,
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2. Influence is more important than
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[Brownsword 2004] Brownsword, Lisa;
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Developing Systems with Commercial
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The SEI Contribution When the SEI s
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[Tyson 2003] Tyson, Barbara; Albert
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system is safe); (2) evidence suppo
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7 Architecture CMU/SEI-2016-SR-027
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1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
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Introduction to Software Architectu
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cation description language, in the
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AFSC/ESD conducted a source selecti
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[Brown 1995] Brown, Alan; Carney, D
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Structural Modeling The Challenge:
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The SEI Contribution As a result of
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Federal Aviation Administration Stu
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evolving understanding of software
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The basic features of Serpent were
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Software Architecture Analysis Meth
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A survey of software architecture e
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Quality Attributes The Challenge: M
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[Barbacci 1995] Barbacci, Mario; Kl
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The Consequence: Effective Evaluati
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[Gallagher 2000] Gallagher, Brian.
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design with some variation built in
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Software Product Lines The Challeng
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A software product line curriculum.
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8 Forensics CMU/SEI-2016-SR-027 | S
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Figure 8: Forensics Timeline CMU/SE
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Introduction to Computer Forensics:
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ultimate contribution of SEI digita
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The SEI’s experience with cases s
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Digital Intelligence and Investigat
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that not only apply to the specific
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9 The Future of Software Engineerin
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A Vision of the Future of Software
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In each case, impact is achieved th
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e-estimation as a means to assess p
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and complexity of these systems are
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10 Conclusion CMU/SEI-2016-SR-027 |
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Highlighting 30 Years of Contributi
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developed network situational aware
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Direct Support to Government System
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In the course of these reviews, the
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Appendix Authors Contributing to th
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Appr
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A Technical History of the SEI

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