Security in Space The Next Generation - UNIDIR

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84 The results of the ILA Space Law Committee’s work on the above-described topics will be reported by our committee to the forthcoming Seventy-third ILA Conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 17–22 August 2008. A panel is also envisaged on this occasion to discuss weaponization and space traffi c management. IDENTIFYING THE MAJOR THREATS TO SPACE SECURITY TODAY The military use of outer space is not a topic specifi cally addressed by COPUOS, but no doubt the delegations are sensing that weapon deployment may affect the safety of outer space activities. A common denominator to be drawn from the doctrine today concurs that space debris should be on the top of the list, followed by weaponization and natural near-Earth objects, such as asteroids and meteorites, and the risk of collisions with Earth. Space debris is an increasing threat to security in outer space. In addition to active satellites—as well as abandoned or inactive satellites—orbiting the Earth, small particles originating from collisions between these objects, known as “second generation debris” imply an extremely serious risk of collision with active satellites, sometimes with untold consequences. These small particles because of their size cannot be detected from Earth at the present state of the art. They travel at very high speeds (roughly 8km per second) and there are currently tens of thousands of those pieces in outer space. As to weaponization, it may be true to say that weapons of mass destruction have not, so far, been deployed in the space environment. Nevertheless, reconnaissance satellites and early warning satellites are constantly transmitting processed information which is then taken into account for decision-making. Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty 6 contains somewhat obscure provisions concerning the demilitarization and denuclearization of outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies. In fact this article has been the target of sharp criticism over the years. Moreover, this situation opens the door for interpretation with all the dangers and uncertainties involved
thereby and which may run counter to the object and purpose of the treaty. Reminiscent of the wording of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the lack of clarity of Article IV becomes much more dangerous in the fi eld of outer space: unlike the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty is unlimited both in time and scope. Voices have been raised advocating the amendment of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. Other views consider that the treaty should remain untouched and any changes be introduced by means of a separate instrument, be it a protocol, code of behaviour, UN resolution or the like. The recent Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, based on a working document on possible elements for a future treaty, submitted by the delegations of Russia and China to the Conference on Disarmament in 2002, 7 embodies some interesting provisions in spite of excluding antisatellite weapons which are today a most serious risk to space security. According to Victor Vasiliev (see his presentation in this volume), even though weapons that are not weapons of mass destruction may be lawfully deployed in outer space, they constitute a potential danger for other space objects and may affect the infrastructure on Earth. It is therefore surprising that anti-satellite weapons are excluded from that draft treaty having in mind that they are real stumbling blocks toward the strengthening of international cooperation, let alone transparency and confi dence-building measures. Near-Earth objects, for their part, pose a real challenge from the legal standpoint. This question has been discussed for some time now at the Scientifi c and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS. The information stemming therefrom will indeed prove useful to start thinking of a more precise legal framework to this growing risk to space security. Indeed the topic seems to be gaining momentum and a place on the agenda of academic institutions dealing with international space law. 8 SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION: THE LANDMARKS What follows are some general comments and recent steps which highlight the road toward the adoption of national and international measures and mechanisms consistent with the objective of the UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. 85
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THE SIMONS FOUNDATION SECURE WORLD
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About the cover Cover photograph co
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CONTENTS Foreword .................
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FOREWORD Outer space is an essentia
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS UNIDIR would like
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xii on the editorial board of The B
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xiv Victor VASILIEV Victor Vasiliev
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CONFERENCE SUMMARY The conference
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Another threat that we need to addr
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humanitarian workers to reach the e
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The question was raised as to wheth
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For this reasons, TCBMs and a treat
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cases actors should engage in consu
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Following the presentations by the
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Could stated national policies, if
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the contrary. Rules in space became
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effects of space weather, and of co
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2 space activities, it has become c
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4 in Outer Space, the Threat or Use
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SPACE GENERATION ADVISORY COUNCIL A
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The fi rst issue is space debris. S
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avoid confl ict by prohibiting weap
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14 For its devastating power, the d
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16 papers elaborating our views on
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DOWN TO EARTH: A SOLUTION TO A GLOB
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for life on Mars could have a numbe
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Combining their expertise in mass s
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26 Perhaps the most widespread civi
Page 57 and 58: 28 strengthen disaster preparedness
Page 59 and 60: 30 solutions for human security, pe
Page 61 and 62: 32 and other small particles. There
Page 63 and 64: NEXT GENERATION SPACE SECURITY CHAL
Page 65 and 66: This is a summary of all objects in
Page 67 and 68: Table 2. Worldwide space situationa
Page 69 and 70: was on par with one another at roug
Page 71 and 72: challenge to the international comm
Page 73 and 74: Notes 1 This research has been made
Page 75 and 76: NO HARMFUL INTERFERENCE WITH SPACE
Page 77 and 78: and the second Strategic Arms Reduc
Page 79 and 80: as well as terrestrial capabilities
Page 81 and 82: The Henry L. Stimson Center, in col
Page 83 and 84: The critics are right to recall tha
Page 85 and 86: forums. It could be negotiated by a
Page 87 and 88: precedent for non-interference with
Page 89 and 90: TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDIN
Page 91 and 92: IADC’s terms of reference also pr
Page 93 and 94: actions. As these groups develop co
Page 95 and 96: TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDIN
Page 97 and 98: In addition, strict compliance with
Page 99 and 100: in considering eventual confi dence
Page 101 and 102: The above-mentioned measures are no
Page 103 and 104: Notes 1 General Assembly, Special R
Page 105 and 106: SAFEGUARDING OUTER SPACE: ON THE RO
Page 107: mechanisms under permanent review,
Page 111 and 112: the discretion of that state—henc
Page 113 and 114: condition of “common agreement”
Page 115 and 116: Foundation, and Rebecca Johnson, di
Page 117 and 118: ANNEX Buenos Aires International In
Page 119 and 120: Refusal to hold consultations, or t
Page 121 and 122: confi rmation thirty days after the
Page 123 and 124: States Parties to the Treaty shall
Page 125 and 126: space law, UN document A/AC.105/C.2
Page 127 and 128: 104 a potential direct threat to ma
Page 129 and 130: 106 SPACE LAW: MANY PRINCIPLES, NO
Page 131 and 132: 108 of government and corporate sta
Page 133 and 134: 110 growth will be badly hurt if th
Page 135 and 136: 112 and samples of residual materia
Page 137 and 138: 114 outer space beyond the geostati
Page 139 and 140: 116 Virgin Galactic had to obtain t
Page 141 and 142: 118 air and space traffi c in the i
Page 143 and 144: 120 aviation and space weather comm
Page 145 and 146: 122 could play a role in lowering o
Page 147 and 148: 124 In other word, space security i
Page 149 and 150: 126 a second meeting of the informa
Page 151 and 152: 128 ANNEX SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION G
Page 153 and 154: 130 Guideline 1: Limit debris relea
Page 155 and 156: 132 that survives to reach the surf
Page 157 and 158: FROM SPACE DOMINANCE TO EQUITABLE R
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The United States has never conduct
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space for any purposes that the Uni
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provide adequate reassurance that n
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SESSION IV TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS:
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146 such weapons, if deployed in ou
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148 DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF A PPWT
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150 preamble—aims of a new treaty
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RUSSIAN-CHINESE SPACE-WEAPONS-BAN P
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this issue would ensure that a trea
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outer space is fundamentally import
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160 it is formed, what power it has
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162 ought to be illegal (or, ought
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164 two specifi c ASAT activities:
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166 CIL has always been an importan
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168 neutral space assets, even if t
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170 Despite that fi stful of treati
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172 in combat. Outer space is, of c
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SESSION V NEXT GENERATION, NEXT STE
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178 the ability to secure borders,
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180 and the Chinese in 2007 have le
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182 LIMITING ORBITAL DEBRIS FORMATI
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184 nations, an essential ingredien
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SPACE SECURITY AND SATELLITE APPLIC
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ROLE OF UNOSAT The initial idea of
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CANADA’S PERSPECTIVE ON SPACE SEC
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The draft treaty on the Prevention
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ACRONYMS ASAT anti-satellite weapon
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