Security in Space The Next Generation - UNIDIR

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56 avoidance, it seems clear that space traffi c management would be vitiated without a non-interference provision, lest debris created innocently be subject to the mandates of the system while debris created wilfully remains perversely outside of it. Space traffi c management also requires consultations, which would be diffi cult to maintain without a harmful interference ban. In fact, the possibility of instituting virtually any consultative measure seems very low without a ban on harmful interference. If there are no defi nite and pre-determined objectionable activities, what is there to consult about? Establishing a space traffi c management system, debris mitigation protocol or consultative mechanism without a strengthened international norm against harmful interference with satellites is analogous to having a nuclear hotline that is automatically turned off during crises. Times of international tension, particularly those caused by an incident in outer space, are times when a code of conduct would be subjected to its most diffi cult test. Without fi rst banning harmful interference, a code of conduct for operating in outer space would be less reliable during crises, when nations rely on their satellites to a particularly great extent. As made clear in this section, a ban on harmful interference with satellites is vital to international security, even if there is no code of conduct governing space operations. Conversely, if the international community opts to pursue a code of conduct for outer space, it cannot hope to succeed without also considering a provision that deals with harmful interference. LIMITING INTERFERENCE LIMITS TESTS BUT NOT LATENT CAPABILITIES One of the most common arguments against a treaty or code of conduct governing activities in outer space is that an exclusive approach to protect satellites would capture military capabilities with other purposes. On the other hand, a narrow approach that focuses solely on “dedicated” antisatellite capabilities would not be suffi ciently protective of satellites, since many technologies have the capability to perform both benign and hostile missions. Furthermore, these critics argue, unscrupulous states will likely ignore the prohibition against developing and deploying the weapons that are banned, leaving the states that stand by the provisions of the agreement at a disadvantage. These arguments do not apply very persuasively to a ban on harmful interference.
The critics are right to recall that a key barrier to concluding space arms control agreements has been the diffi culty in defi ning space weapons. As noted by former US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control Robert Joseph, “… negotiations [during the Carter administration] were stymied by questions of which so-called ‘space weapons’ capabilities should be limited—co-orbital interceptors, direct-ascent interceptors, ground-based, or just space-based directed-energy systems”. 4 However, space weapons do not have to be defi ned in order to maintain a provision banning harmful interference. The prohibition of harmful interference with satellites is specifi cally designed to take into account the multi-purpose nature of space technology. Missile defence systems, satellites capable of shifting their orbits and even the Space Shuttle could be used to interfere with satellites. While some of these systems are considered more threatening than others, the fact remains that when negotiators seek to defi ne space weapons, their defi nitions will always be too encompassing or too narrow, depending on the perspective of their respective states. Banning the act of interference rather than the existence of “weapons” bypasses this diffi culty altogether. Doing so is not without precedent—weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have been stockpiled for decades without being used. Though WMDs obviously have more horrifi c effects, and thus have not been used for somewhat different reasons, the analogy holds because the fi rst use of a space weapon in military confl ict, like the use of a WMD, is unlikely to be a singular event. The existence of weapons does not imply their eventual or inevitable use if the consequences of such use can be devastating for both combatants. An additional benefi t of seeking to defi ne harmful interference rather than seeking to ban space weapons is that it eases the dilemmas associated with verifi cation. As noted by numerous critics of space weapons treaties, it would be extremely diffi cult to verify the absence of space weapons from the arsenal of a potential adversary. This problem would be exacerbated by the existence of numerous dual-use technologies and weapons systems. However, parties to a code of conduct do not need to concern themselves with what constitutes a space weapon or engage in the seemingly hopeless task of agreeing on a common defi nition of one. Instead, they need only focus upon one application of multi-purpose technologies—their use to interfere harmfully with satellites and other space objects. Monitoring and verifi cation of this singular application would be left to national technical means, as would the choice of a response in the event that purposeful, harmful interference occurs. Clarifying harmful interference and ensuring 57
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THE SIMONS FOUNDATION SECURE WORLD
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About the cover Cover photograph co
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CONTENTS Foreword .................
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FOREWORD Outer space is an essentia
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS UNIDIR would like
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xii on the editorial board of The B
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xiv Victor VASILIEV Victor Vasiliev
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CONFERENCE SUMMARY The conference
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Another threat that we need to addr
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humanitarian workers to reach the e
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The question was raised as to wheth
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For this reasons, TCBMs and a treat
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cases actors should engage in consu
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Following the presentations by the
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Could stated national policies, if
Page 31 and 32: the contrary. Rules in space became
Page 33 and 34: effects of space weather, and of co
Page 35 and 36: 2 space activities, it has become c
Page 37 and 38: 4 in Outer Space, the Threat or Use
Page 39 and 40: SPACE GENERATION ADVISORY COUNCIL A
Page 41 and 42: The fi rst issue is space debris. S
Page 43 and 44: avoid confl ict by prohibiting weap
Page 45 and 46: 14 For its devastating power, the d
Page 47 and 48: 16 papers elaborating our views on
Page 49 and 50: DOWN TO EARTH: A SOLUTION TO A GLOB
Page 51 and 52: for life on Mars could have a numbe
Page 53 and 54: Combining their expertise in mass s
Page 55 and 56: 26 Perhaps the most widespread civi
Page 57 and 58: 28 strengthen disaster preparedness
Page 59 and 60: 30 solutions for human security, pe
Page 61 and 62: 32 and other small particles. There
Page 63 and 64: NEXT GENERATION SPACE SECURITY CHAL
Page 65 and 66: This is a summary of all objects in
Page 67 and 68: Table 2. Worldwide space situationa
Page 69 and 70: was on par with one another at roug
Page 71 and 72: challenge to the international comm
Page 73 and 74: Notes 1 This research has been made
Page 75 and 76: NO HARMFUL INTERFERENCE WITH SPACE
Page 77 and 78: and the second Strategic Arms Reduc
Page 79 and 80: as well as terrestrial capabilities
Page 81: The Henry L. Stimson Center, in col
Page 85 and 86: forums. It could be negotiated by a
Page 87 and 88: precedent for non-interference with
Page 89 and 90: TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDIN
Page 91 and 92: IADC’s terms of reference also pr
Page 93 and 94: actions. As these groups develop co
Page 95 and 96: TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDIN
Page 97 and 98: In addition, strict compliance with
Page 99 and 100: in considering eventual confi dence
Page 101 and 102: The above-mentioned measures are no
Page 103 and 104: Notes 1 General Assembly, Special R
Page 105 and 106: SAFEGUARDING OUTER SPACE: ON THE RO
Page 107 and 108: mechanisms under permanent review,
Page 109 and 110: thereby and which may run counter t
Page 111 and 112: the discretion of that state—henc
Page 113 and 114: condition of “common agreement”
Page 115 and 116: Foundation, and Rebecca Johnson, di
Page 117 and 118: ANNEX Buenos Aires International In
Page 119 and 120: Refusal to hold consultations, or t
Page 121 and 122: confi rmation thirty days after the
Page 123 and 124: States Parties to the Treaty shall
Page 125 and 126: space law, UN document A/AC.105/C.2
Page 127 and 128: 104 a potential direct threat to ma
Page 129 and 130: 106 SPACE LAW: MANY PRINCIPLES, NO
Page 131 and 132: 108 of government and corporate sta
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110 growth will be badly hurt if th
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112 and samples of residual materia
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114 outer space beyond the geostati
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116 Virgin Galactic had to obtain t
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118 air and space traffi c in the i
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120 aviation and space weather comm
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122 could play a role in lowering o
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124 In other word, space security i
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126 a second meeting of the informa
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128 ANNEX SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION G
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130 Guideline 1: Limit debris relea
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132 that survives to reach the surf
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FROM SPACE DOMINANCE TO EQUITABLE R
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The United States has never conduct
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space for any purposes that the Uni
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provide adequate reassurance that n
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SESSION IV TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS:
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146 such weapons, if deployed in ou
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148 DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF A PPWT
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150 preamble—aims of a new treaty
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RUSSIAN-CHINESE SPACE-WEAPONS-BAN P
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this issue would ensure that a trea
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outer space is fundamentally import
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160 it is formed, what power it has
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162 ought to be illegal (or, ought
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164 two specifi c ASAT activities:
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166 CIL has always been an importan
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168 neutral space assets, even if t
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170 Despite that fi stful of treati
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172 in combat. Outer space is, of c
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SESSION V NEXT GENERATION, NEXT STE
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178 the ability to secure borders,
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180 and the Chinese in 2007 have le
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182 LIMITING ORBITAL DEBRIS FORMATI
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184 nations, an essential ingredien
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SPACE SECURITY AND SATELLITE APPLIC
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ROLE OF UNOSAT The initial idea of
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CANADA’S PERSPECTIVE ON SPACE SEC
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The draft treaty on the Prevention
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ACRONYMS ASAT anti-satellite weapon
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