Security in Space The Next Generation - UNIDIR

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42 Although the spread of missile and anti-missile capabilities is predominantly driven by security concerns on Earth and not necessarily linked to space capabilities, it has the potential to threaten the security of space operations. Managing this threat in the future will require initiatives not only aimed at enhancing the security of outer space, but also to address the driving security concerns on Earth. PROLIFERATION OF SPACE TECHNOLOGIES: SPACE-BASED CAPABILITIES Another technological source of insecurity in the future is likely to come from the research and development of advanced, space-based technologies that could threaten secure and sustainable use of outer space. Examples of such technologies include, but are not limited to, microsatellite and smaller spacecraft capabilities, manoeuvrability and docking capabilities, and laser communication. These technologies are not by their nature threatening, and none are currently linked to dedicated anti-satellite systems, but they have the potential to serve a variety of purposes that can be diffi cult to verify once based in outer space. Not only could these technologies be used to physically threaten satellites, but due to their dual-use abilities, they can cause perceptions and misperceptions of insecurity in outer space, which can lead to very real consequences. The challenge for the future will be to create systems or mechanisms of verifi cation, trust and transparency, particularly in light of the growing number and diversity of actors in outer space and the current obstacles to reliable monitoring of that environment. Otherwise it will be diffi cult to verify the purpose of space-based capabilities and to keep perceptual sources of insecurity and consequent reactions from spiralling out of control. PROLIFERATION OF SPACE TECHNOLOGIES: SPACE-TO-EARTH STRIKE There are currently no space-to-Earth strike capabilities. The United States continues to explore advanced technologies that could enable such a capability through programmes such as the Near Field Infrared Experiment and other missile defence initiatives, but there are no currently no programmes or policies in place to pursue such a capability. Nonetheless, the potential for space-to-Earth strike systems will continue to pose a
challenge to the international community in the future, particularly as advanced space-based technologies continue to be developed, which may lead to hedging strategies. Moreover, while some enabling technologies for space-based strike are discrete and include signifi cant technological barriers, many are advanced technologies associated with other space applications and have been developed for a variety of purposes by several different actors (see Table 3). This means that if one actor were to pursue a space-based strike capability, others could follow. The dynamic nature of space technology makes it diffi cult to control or to dominate, allowing for an escalation of capabilities in outer space. Like the risks posed by the ground-based and space-based systems discussed above, the challenge of space-based strike is not simply one of technology spread, but is inherently linked to transparency, confi dence and unresolved security issues both in outer space and on Earth. SPACE SECURITY: NEXT-GENERATION RESPONSES Analysis of current trends in space security indicates that the challenges of tomorrow will have behavioural, perceptual, organizational and technological roots. Moreover, these challenges are interconnected and in many ways serve to reinforce one another, and they are deeply entrenched in other security issues on Earth. These characteristics suggest that a variety of tools will be needed that will also work together to create broad security in outer space, and also address related security challenges on Earth, such as missile and ballistic missile defence, and nuclear capabilities. Current proposals for space security address a range of these challenges together, but not independently. It is important to consider the relationships between them and how they might work with one another to create a holistic governance regime for outer space. The question to be answered is not which tool is most needed, most practical or most attainable, but what can be done today to address each of these challenges in the future. This is a question of political will. 43
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THE SIMONS FOUNDATION SECURE WORLD
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About the cover Cover photograph co
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CONTENTS Foreword .................
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FOREWORD Outer space is an essentia
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS UNIDIR would like
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xii on the editorial board of The B
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xiv Victor VASILIEV Victor Vasiliev
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CONFERENCE SUMMARY The conference
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Another threat that we need to addr
Page 19 and 20: humanitarian workers to reach the e
Page 21 and 22: The question was raised as to wheth
Page 23 and 24: For this reasons, TCBMs and a treat
Page 25 and 26: cases actors should engage in consu
Page 27 and 28: Following the presentations by the
Page 29 and 30: Could stated national policies, if
Page 31 and 32: the contrary. Rules in space became
Page 33 and 34: effects of space weather, and of co
Page 35 and 36: 2 space activities, it has become c
Page 37 and 38: 4 in Outer Space, the Threat or Use
Page 39 and 40: SPACE GENERATION ADVISORY COUNCIL A
Page 41 and 42: The fi rst issue is space debris. S
Page 43 and 44: avoid confl ict by prohibiting weap
Page 45 and 46: 14 For its devastating power, the d
Page 47 and 48: 16 papers elaborating our views on
Page 49 and 50: DOWN TO EARTH: A SOLUTION TO A GLOB
Page 51 and 52: for life on Mars could have a numbe
Page 53 and 54: Combining their expertise in mass s
Page 55 and 56: 26 Perhaps the most widespread civi
Page 57 and 58: 28 strengthen disaster preparedness
Page 59 and 60: 30 solutions for human security, pe
Page 61 and 62: 32 and other small particles. There
Page 63 and 64: NEXT GENERATION SPACE SECURITY CHAL
Page 65 and 66: This is a summary of all objects in
Page 67 and 68: Table 2. Worldwide space situationa
Page 69: was on par with one another at roug
Page 73 and 74: Notes 1 This research has been made
Page 75 and 76: NO HARMFUL INTERFERENCE WITH SPACE
Page 77 and 78: and the second Strategic Arms Reduc
Page 79 and 80: as well as terrestrial capabilities
Page 81 and 82: The Henry L. Stimson Center, in col
Page 83 and 84: The critics are right to recall tha
Page 85 and 86: forums. It could be negotiated by a
Page 87 and 88: precedent for non-interference with
Page 89 and 90: TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDIN
Page 91 and 92: IADC’s terms of reference also pr
Page 93 and 94: actions. As these groups develop co
Page 95 and 96: TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDIN
Page 97 and 98: In addition, strict compliance with
Page 99 and 100: in considering eventual confi dence
Page 101 and 102: The above-mentioned measures are no
Page 103 and 104: Notes 1 General Assembly, Special R
Page 105 and 106: SAFEGUARDING OUTER SPACE: ON THE RO
Page 107 and 108: mechanisms under permanent review,
Page 109 and 110: thereby and which may run counter t
Page 111 and 112: the discretion of that state—henc
Page 113 and 114: condition of “common agreement”
Page 115 and 116: Foundation, and Rebecca Johnson, di
Page 117 and 118: ANNEX Buenos Aires International In
Page 119 and 120: Refusal to hold consultations, or t
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confi rmation thirty days after the
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States Parties to the Treaty shall
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space law, UN document A/AC.105/C.2
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104 a potential direct threat to ma
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106 SPACE LAW: MANY PRINCIPLES, NO
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108 of government and corporate sta
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110 growth will be badly hurt if th
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112 and samples of residual materia
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114 outer space beyond the geostati
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116 Virgin Galactic had to obtain t
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118 air and space traffi c in the i
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120 aviation and space weather comm
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122 could play a role in lowering o
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124 In other word, space security i
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126 a second meeting of the informa
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128 ANNEX SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION G
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130 Guideline 1: Limit debris relea
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132 that survives to reach the surf
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FROM SPACE DOMINANCE TO EQUITABLE R
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The United States has never conduct
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space for any purposes that the Uni
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provide adequate reassurance that n
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SESSION IV TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS:
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146 such weapons, if deployed in ou
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148 DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF A PPWT
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150 preamble—aims of a new treaty
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RUSSIAN-CHINESE SPACE-WEAPONS-BAN P
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this issue would ensure that a trea
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outer space is fundamentally import
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160 it is formed, what power it has
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162 ought to be illegal (or, ought
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164 two specifi c ASAT activities:
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166 CIL has always been an importan
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168 neutral space assets, even if t
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170 Despite that fi stful of treati
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172 in combat. Outer space is, of c
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SESSION V NEXT GENERATION, NEXT STE
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178 the ability to secure borders,
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180 and the Chinese in 2007 have le
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182 LIMITING ORBITAL DEBRIS FORMATI
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184 nations, an essential ingredien
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SPACE SECURITY AND SATELLITE APPLIC
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ROLE OF UNOSAT The initial idea of
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CANADA’S PERSPECTIVE ON SPACE SEC
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The draft treaty on the Prevention
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ACRONYMS ASAT anti-satellite weapon
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