Security in Space The Next Generation - UNIDIR
Security in Space The Next Generation - UNIDIR
Security in Space The Next Generation - UNIDIR
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170<br />
Despite that fi stful of treaties, however, the pattern of manufactur<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
test<strong>in</strong>g, occasionally us<strong>in</strong>g and perpetually prepar<strong>in</strong>g to use chemical<br />
weapons persisted through the twentieth century. Each of the major<br />
participants <strong>in</strong> the Second World War voluntarily and unilaterally declared<br />
that it would not be the fi rst to <strong>in</strong>troduce chemical weapons <strong>in</strong>to combat,<br />
but each zealously manufactured thousands of tons of the stuff (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
new generations of nerve agents that were immensely more lethal than the<br />
relatively simple tox<strong>in</strong>s that had <strong>in</strong>fl amed the central battlefi elds of the First<br />
World War). Even after 1945, massive stockpiles were assiduously reta<strong>in</strong>ed,<br />
tested and improved, and there were repeated <strong>in</strong>cidents of the use of CW<br />
(or at least allegations about use—it has typically been very diffi cult to<br />
prove conclusively that lethal chemicals were, <strong>in</strong> fact, employed). Deadly<br />
CW polluted the battlefi elds <strong>in</strong> confl icts as diverse as that between Egypt<br />
and Yemen <strong>in</strong> the 1960s, Chad and Libya <strong>in</strong> the 1980s and Iran and Iraq<br />
<strong>in</strong> the 1980s.<br />
Only <strong>in</strong> 1993 did the world conclude, through the good offi ces of the CD,<br />
a comprehensive treaty absolutely forbidd<strong>in</strong>g this nasty form of confl ict,<br />
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,<br />
Stockpil<strong>in</strong>g and Use of Chemical Weapons and on <strong>The</strong>ir Destruction (the<br />
Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC). This <strong>in</strong>strument has proven to<br />
be remarkably successful, already attract<strong>in</strong>g the adherence of some 184<br />
participat<strong>in</strong>g states and lead<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>in</strong>ternationally supervised destruction<br />
of almost 30,000 tons of lethal agent.<br />
Still, equally remarkable is one crucial CIL-related aspect of this story:<br />
even before the CWC came onto the scene, CIL had already <strong>in</strong>stituted<br />
a legal prohibition on CW. That is, most experts would concur that at<br />
some po<strong>in</strong>t dur<strong>in</strong>g the twentieth century (after 1925 but before 1993), the<br />
use of CW (or at least the fi rst use of CW <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational armed confl ict)<br />
had been rendered illegal. <strong>The</strong> prohibition was <strong>in</strong>stituted by the nowfamiliar<br />
comb<strong>in</strong>ation of the objective criteria (long-stand<strong>in</strong>g, wide-spread<br />
concordant state practice) and the subjective op<strong>in</strong>io juris (the sense that<br />
CW combat was no longer acceptable, and that states were already under<br />
a legal obligation to refra<strong>in</strong> from <strong>in</strong>itiat<strong>in</strong>g its use).<br />
This CIL barrier aga<strong>in</strong>st chemical weapons, based upon the entrenched<br />
sense with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternational community that it was no longer tolerable<br />
as a method of warfare, even <strong>in</strong> pursuit of legitimate objectives, predated<br />
the CWC and is not superseded by it. <strong>The</strong> CIL rule thus rema<strong>in</strong>s obligatory