Security in Space The Next Generation - UNIDIR

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60 discussed above) which is binding on the conduct of federal agencies. Such signalling devices would not be binding on the United States vis-à-vis other signatories. As noted by the Congressional Research Service, “… [political] agreements may be considered morally binding by the parties, and the President may be making a type of national commitment when he enters one”. 9 This notwithstanding, legally binding agreements are preferred to other agreements by many nations. There is no treaty banning space weapons that is likely to be verifi able and have reassuring enforcement provisions. It is also likely that any treaty that is not verifi able and enforceable will be unattractive to several of the major spacefaring nations, including the United States. A code of conduct sets aside issues that are likely to bedevil treaty negotiators for a decade or more. In a code of conduct, verifi cation and determination of compliance would be left to national authorities. One substantive task of negotiators would be to defi ne precisely what constitutes “harmful interference”. This task is far simpler than trying to reach agreed defi nitions of what a treaty regarding space weapons would seek to ban. Regardless of the precise defi nition of harmful interference, participating states can request consultations when they witness ambiguous events or events they perceive as interference. A refusal to comply with such requests would be a show of bad faith and would reinforce negative assessments. The dilemmas associated with enforcement will continue to exist regardless of the form in which a space security agreement appears. All potential agreements would require consultation measures, and at times these consultations may prove to be unsatisfactory. If signatories to a space security agreement violate their pledges, states that feel disadvantaged have the sovereign right to respond, including the right to withdraw from the agreement. In the wake of the tests carried out by the Chinese and American governments, near-term actions are required to strengthen norms against harmful interference with space objects. The best option may be to employ a hybrid formulation consisting of a political agreement during the initial norm-building period, to be reinforced subsequently by the force of international law. An instrument negotiated in a forum which does not require consensus and that is considered by the US government to be an executive agreement would be attractive for the reasons outlined above. Agreement on a code of conduct that includes a no-harmful-interference provision would reinforce the norm-building process created by the network of other treaties that relate to outer space. Besides those setting the
precedent for non-interference with satellites, there are also the Liability Convention, the Rescue Agreement, the Registration Convention and the Moon Agreement, all of which have been adopted by the UN General Assembly. 10 The existence of this body of existing law indicates that the norm against satellite interference is present, but in need of reinforcement. CONCLUSION My goal has been to convince the reader that a code of conduct accompanied by a ban on harmful interference with satellites would signifi cantly enhance space security. I have further argued that, even in the absence any signifi cant movement forward from the status quo, a measure preventing harmful interference would have signifi cant benefi ts. I have explained how this proposal bypasses many of the common objections to formal arms control measures in outer space. By continuing the current efforts to improve space situational awareness, the strongest objections to a harmful-interference ban—those about the inability to verify the banned activity—will be rendered moot. It is my sincere hope that such a proposal will be seriously considered and advanced in the coming years. Notes 1 For a copy of the draft code of conduct, see . 2 Tonga initially registered the last 16 available slots in 1988 and then reduced its claim to seven slots following the receipt of numerous protests. 3 David Shiga, “Mysterious source jams satellite communications,” NewScientist.com, 26 January 2006, . 4 Robert Joseph, “Remarks on the President’s National Space Policy—Assuring America’s Vital Interests”, Center for Space and Defense Forum, 11 January 2007, . 5 US Congressional Research Service, “Treaties and other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate”, 2001. 61
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THE SIMONS FOUNDATION SECURE WORLD
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About the cover Cover photograph co
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CONTENTS Foreword .................
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FOREWORD Outer space is an essentia
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS UNIDIR would like
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xii on the editorial board of The B
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xiv Victor VASILIEV Victor Vasiliev
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CONFERENCE SUMMARY The conference
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Another threat that we need to addr
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humanitarian workers to reach the e
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The question was raised as to wheth
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For this reasons, TCBMs and a treat
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cases actors should engage in consu
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Following the presentations by the
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Could stated national policies, if
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the contrary. Rules in space became
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effects of space weather, and of co
Page 35 and 36: 2 space activities, it has become c
Page 37 and 38: 4 in Outer Space, the Threat or Use
Page 39 and 40: SPACE GENERATION ADVISORY COUNCIL A
Page 41 and 42: The fi rst issue is space debris. S
Page 43 and 44: avoid confl ict by prohibiting weap
Page 45 and 46: 14 For its devastating power, the d
Page 47 and 48: 16 papers elaborating our views on
Page 49 and 50: DOWN TO EARTH: A SOLUTION TO A GLOB
Page 51 and 52: for life on Mars could have a numbe
Page 53 and 54: Combining their expertise in mass s
Page 55 and 56: 26 Perhaps the most widespread civi
Page 57 and 58: 28 strengthen disaster preparedness
Page 59 and 60: 30 solutions for human security, pe
Page 61 and 62: 32 and other small particles. There
Page 63 and 64: NEXT GENERATION SPACE SECURITY CHAL
Page 65 and 66: This is a summary of all objects in
Page 67 and 68: Table 2. Worldwide space situationa
Page 69 and 70: was on par with one another at roug
Page 71 and 72: challenge to the international comm
Page 73 and 74: Notes 1 This research has been made
Page 75 and 76: NO HARMFUL INTERFERENCE WITH SPACE
Page 77 and 78: and the second Strategic Arms Reduc
Page 79 and 80: as well as terrestrial capabilities
Page 81 and 82: The Henry L. Stimson Center, in col
Page 83 and 84: The critics are right to recall tha
Page 85: forums. It could be negotiated by a
Page 89 and 90: TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDIN
Page 91 and 92: IADC’s terms of reference also pr
Page 93 and 94: actions. As these groups develop co
Page 95 and 96: TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDIN
Page 97 and 98: In addition, strict compliance with
Page 99 and 100: in considering eventual confi dence
Page 101 and 102: The above-mentioned measures are no
Page 103 and 104: Notes 1 General Assembly, Special R
Page 105 and 106: SAFEGUARDING OUTER SPACE: ON THE RO
Page 107 and 108: mechanisms under permanent review,
Page 109 and 110: thereby and which may run counter t
Page 111 and 112: the discretion of that state—henc
Page 113 and 114: condition of “common agreement”
Page 115 and 116: Foundation, and Rebecca Johnson, di
Page 117 and 118: ANNEX Buenos Aires International In
Page 119 and 120: Refusal to hold consultations, or t
Page 121 and 122: confi rmation thirty days after the
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Page 125 and 126: space law, UN document A/AC.105/C.2
Page 127 and 128: 104 a potential direct threat to ma
Page 129 and 130: 106 SPACE LAW: MANY PRINCIPLES, NO
Page 131 and 132: 108 of government and corporate sta
Page 133 and 134: 110 growth will be badly hurt if th
Page 135 and 136: 112 and samples of residual materia
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114 outer space beyond the geostati
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116 Virgin Galactic had to obtain t
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118 air and space traffi c in the i
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120 aviation and space weather comm
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122 could play a role in lowering o
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124 In other word, space security i
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126 a second meeting of the informa
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128 ANNEX SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION G
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130 Guideline 1: Limit debris relea
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132 that survives to reach the surf
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FROM SPACE DOMINANCE TO EQUITABLE R
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The United States has never conduct
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space for any purposes that the Uni
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provide adequate reassurance that n
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SESSION IV TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS:
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146 such weapons, if deployed in ou
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148 DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF A PPWT
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150 preamble—aims of a new treaty
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RUSSIAN-CHINESE SPACE-WEAPONS-BAN P
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this issue would ensure that a trea
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outer space is fundamentally import
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160 it is formed, what power it has
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162 ought to be illegal (or, ought
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164 two specifi c ASAT activities:
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166 CIL has always been an importan
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168 neutral space assets, even if t
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170 Despite that fi stful of treati
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172 in combat. Outer space is, of c
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SESSION V NEXT GENERATION, NEXT STE
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178 the ability to secure borders,
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180 and the Chinese in 2007 have le
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182 LIMITING ORBITAL DEBRIS FORMATI
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184 nations, an essential ingredien
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SPACE SECURITY AND SATELLITE APPLIC
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ROLE OF UNOSAT The initial idea of
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CANADA’S PERSPECTIVE ON SPACE SEC
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The draft treaty on the Prevention
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ACRONYMS ASAT anti-satellite weapon
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