Security in Space The Next Generation - UNIDIR

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what is now legally obligatory in the realm of outer space weaponry, those articulations can carry great weight in measuring CIL. THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE Outer space has proven to be an especially illustrative region for the development of CIL. Here, the nominal requirement that the pattern of observed state behaviour be “long standing” has been particularly observed in the breach—within only a decade or so after the fi rst Sputnik orbits, the basic framework of the CIL of outer space was already largely in place as “instant” CIL. The early activities of the fi rst spacefaring nations, eliciting near-uniform endorsement from other countries, initiated a remarkably rapid period of CIL generation in the new realm of outer space. Prominent precedentsetting resolutions of the General Assembly, underwritten by the leading states, quickly defi ned many of the applicable rules of conduct for extraterrestrial human operations. Even before the conclusion of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, many of its key principles had already been instituted as binding rules, accepted by the sometimes elusive, but here quite emphatic, consensus process of CIL. For example, the notions that states cannot validly assert sovereign claims to outer space, that the exploration and use of outer space must be carried out for the benefi t and in the interests of all countries, and that activities in outer space must be conducted in accordance with international law were probably all embedded as accepted propositions of CIL even before they were written into the OST. These principles, asserted as solemn pronouncements by the international community, had attained suffi ciently widespread acceptance, from a sense of legal obligation, even before the act of codifi cation. The treaty became a more-defi nite, easier-to-cite expression of those rules, but they were promulgated in the fi rst instance by CIL, not by the OST. GENERAL CIL AND ASATS To assess whether general customary international law can now make further contributions to the security of outer space, we need to consider 163
164 two specifi c ASAT activities: testing in outer space and use in combat. (A comprehensive ASAT treaty might well seek to regulate other aspects of the weapons-development cycle, too, such as the research, development, possession and deployment of ASATs, but for present purposes, it will be suffi cient to focus on testing and use.) What do we observe about the actual pattern of state behaviour in this area? First, regarding space testing of ASAT devices, we have a reasonably public history to scrutinize. The United States tested two main types of interceptor vehicles approximately 30 times from the late 1950s through the early 1970s, and the Soviet Union tested its interceptor anti-satellite vehicle a total of approximately 20 times from 1968 to 1971 and from 1976 to 1982. The United States also conducted two tests of a rather different sort of interceptor in 1984 against unoccupied points in outer space, and one test against a target satellite in 1985. China became the third state to destroy a satellite in orbit, with a couple of exercises that did not involve collisions, and one, on 11 January 2007, that did impact and destroy its target. Most recently, on 20 February 2008, the United States employed a modifi ed ballistic missile interceptor to destroy a failing reconnaissance satellite as it re-entered the Earth’s atmosphere. In addition, these three have also explored systems based on high-energy lasers or other directed-energy technologies, rather than on physical interceptors. The most conspicuous illustration of such was the 1997 US experiment with the MIRACL (Mid-InfraRed Advanced Chemical Laser), based in New Mexico. That test, intended to assess the extent to which a powerful ground-based energy beam system could locate, track, illuminate, and damage, disrupt, or destroy an orbiting satellite, has still not been fully described to the public. The possible laser systems of other countries have been even more shrouded from public view. The Soviet Union allegedly developed a capability of this sort at Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan in the 1980s, and furtive press reports indicate that China may have tested a directed energy system to illuminate, temporarily blind or otherwise affect the operations of satellites in the fall of 2006. Totalling up all that activity, we fi nd (depending upon how one counts the ambiguous reports) fewer than 60 genuine tests in outer space, conducted by only three states, with only about a half dozen of those incidents occurring in the past 25 years.
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THE SIMONS FOUNDATION SECURE WORLD
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About the cover Cover photograph co
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CONTENTS Foreword .................
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FOREWORD Outer space is an essentia
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS UNIDIR would like
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xii on the editorial board of The B
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xiv Victor VASILIEV Victor Vasiliev
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CONFERENCE SUMMARY The conference
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Another threat that we need to addr
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humanitarian workers to reach the e
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The question was raised as to wheth
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For this reasons, TCBMs and a treat
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cases actors should engage in consu
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Following the presentations by the
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Could stated national policies, if
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the contrary. Rules in space became
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effects of space weather, and of co
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2 space activities, it has become c
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4 in Outer Space, the Threat or Use
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SPACE GENERATION ADVISORY COUNCIL A
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The fi rst issue is space debris. S
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avoid confl ict by prohibiting weap
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14 For its devastating power, the d
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16 papers elaborating our views on
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DOWN TO EARTH: A SOLUTION TO A GLOB
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for life on Mars could have a numbe
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Combining their expertise in mass s
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26 Perhaps the most widespread civi
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28 strengthen disaster preparedness
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30 solutions for human security, pe
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32 and other small particles. There
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NEXT GENERATION SPACE SECURITY CHAL
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This is a summary of all objects in
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Table 2. Worldwide space situationa
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was on par with one another at roug
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challenge to the international comm
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Notes 1 This research has been made
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NO HARMFUL INTERFERENCE WITH SPACE
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and the second Strategic Arms Reduc
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as well as terrestrial capabilities
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The Henry L. Stimson Center, in col
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The critics are right to recall tha
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forums. It could be negotiated by a
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precedent for non-interference with
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TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDIN
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IADC’s terms of reference also pr
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actions. As these groups develop co
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TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDIN
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In addition, strict compliance with
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in considering eventual confi dence
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The above-mentioned measures are no
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Notes 1 General Assembly, Special R
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SAFEGUARDING OUTER SPACE: ON THE RO
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mechanisms under permanent review,
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thereby and which may run counter t
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the discretion of that state—henc
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condition of “common agreement”
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Foundation, and Rebecca Johnson, di
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ANNEX Buenos Aires International In
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Refusal to hold consultations, or t
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confi rmation thirty days after the
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States Parties to the Treaty shall
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space law, UN document A/AC.105/C.2
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104 a potential direct threat to ma
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106 SPACE LAW: MANY PRINCIPLES, NO
Page 131 and 132: 108 of government and corporate sta
Page 133 and 134: 110 growth will be badly hurt if th
Page 135 and 136: 112 and samples of residual materia
Page 137 and 138: 114 outer space beyond the geostati
Page 139 and 140: 116 Virgin Galactic had to obtain t
Page 141 and 142: 118 air and space traffi c in the i
Page 143 and 144: 120 aviation and space weather comm
Page 145 and 146: 122 could play a role in lowering o
Page 147 and 148: 124 In other word, space security i
Page 149 and 150: 126 a second meeting of the informa
Page 151 and 152: 128 ANNEX SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION G
Page 153 and 154: 130 Guideline 1: Limit debris relea
Page 155 and 156: 132 that survives to reach the surf
Page 157 and 158: FROM SPACE DOMINANCE TO EQUITABLE R
Page 159 and 160: The United States has never conduct
Page 161 and 162: space for any purposes that the Uni
Page 163 and 164: provide adequate reassurance that n
Page 165 and 166: SESSION IV TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS:
Page 167 and 168: 146 such weapons, if deployed in ou
Page 169 and 170: 148 DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF A PPWT
Page 171 and 172: 150 preamble—aims of a new treaty
Page 173 and 174: RUSSIAN-CHINESE SPACE-WEAPONS-BAN P
Page 175 and 176: this issue would ensure that a trea
Page 177 and 178: outer space is fundamentally import
Page 179 and 180: 160 it is formed, what power it has
Page 181: 162 ought to be illegal (or, ought
Page 185 and 186: 166 CIL has always been an importan
Page 187 and 188: 168 neutral space assets, even if t
Page 189 and 190: 170 Despite that fi stful of treati
Page 191 and 192: 172 in combat. Outer space is, of c
Page 193 and 194: SESSION V NEXT GENERATION, NEXT STE
Page 195 and 196: 178 the ability to secure borders,
Page 197 and 198: 180 and the Chinese in 2007 have le
Page 199 and 200: 182 LIMITING ORBITAL DEBRIS FORMATI
Page 201 and 202: 184 nations, an essential ingredien
Page 203 and 204: SPACE SECURITY AND SATELLITE APPLIC
Page 205 and 206: ROLE OF UNOSAT The initial idea of
Page 207 and 208: CANADA’S PERSPECTIVE ON SPACE SEC
Page 209 and 210: The draft treaty on the Prevention
Page 211: ACRONYMS ASAT anti-satellite weapon
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