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-243-<br />

negotiations which were held between B.M.C. and the Government,<br />

mainly represented by J. Milton Weeks and Cyril Bright,<br />

Secretaries of the Departments of the Treasury and Planning and<br />

Economic Affairs respectively. <strong>The</strong>se negotiations focussed on a<br />

revision of the 1964 pricing formula. In 1964 B.M.C had agreed<br />

that for a period of ten years the sales price of its<br />

concentrated ore would be the same average price the German steel<br />

works had paid L.M.C. during the past five years. As prices<br />

dropped substantially in the years following this agreement the<br />

owners of the mining company wanted to revise this pricing<br />

agreement according to which they were paying more for the<br />

concentrates produced by their own company in Liberia than it<br />

would cost to buy them on the international market.<br />

An attempt to have this arrangement changed, already made in<br />

1966, failed, although a compromise was reached in that any<br />

production in excess of 3 million tons could be sold at the<br />

prevailing world market prices. (This largely explains Bong's<br />

expansion activities of 1967 - see Table 16 the "Summarized<br />

History of B.M.C"). <strong>The</strong> second effort of the Germans was more<br />

successful In September 1968 it was agreed that Bong would be<br />

allowed to abandon the 1964 pricing arrangement in exchange for<br />

(I) a withholding tax (on interest payments) provided, however,<br />

that a tax credit be obtained in the country of the investor(s)<br />

(which was realized 1971 and 1974 with respect to the German<br />

and Italian investors respectively, see above), (II) a vague<br />

promise to undertake as soon as would be possible an appropriate<br />

modification of the debt-equity ratio, and (III) an expansion<br />

programme of approximately $ 44 million (98).<br />

Though the Treasury did benefit from these withholding taxes, the<br />

majority of B.M.C.'s loans were exempted from this tax (i.e. the<br />

interest payments made on loans from the Kreditanstalt fur<br />

Wiederaufbau which loans formed the major portion of B.M.C.'s<br />

indebtedness in combination with the exemption granted to<br />

Finsider). This, together with the loopholes included in the<br />

provisions of the 1974 Supplemental Agreement with respect to<br />

the maximum debt-equity ratio of 3 : 1, makes the overall result<br />

of the 1968 revision of the pricing formula appear to have been<br />

to the advantage of B.M.C. and to the disadvantage of the<br />

Liberian Treasury.<br />

<strong>The</strong> 1974 Supplemental Agreement<br />

In April 1973 negotiations started for a review of the 1958<br />

Concession Agreement. A supplemental Agreement was concluded on<br />

December 16, 1974. <strong>The</strong> signing coincided with the merger of<br />

B.M.C. and DELIMCO, a merger which was effective retro-actively<br />

to January 1, 1974, and which made B.M.C. the Concessionaire.<br />

<strong>The</strong> ownership structure was not fundamentally changed, the<br />

Government maintaining its 50? interest through the ownership of<br />

the Class A Common Stock of B.M.C. whereas an equivalent amount<br />

of Class B Common Stock is being held by the private investors,<br />

the owners of the German, Italian and Dutch steel works.

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