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'••] the most organized and intensive training activity in the<br />

:j private (and public) sectors of the Liberian economy (3).<br />

|| Bong Mining Company's efforts in this respect were significantly<br />

S| less but nonetheless ranked second within the national context<br />

I (4).<br />

|| However, it is worth mentioning that through the ownership<br />

|| structure of these companies the Liberian Government participated<br />

II in the financing of these training and educational activities in<br />

; | conformity with the number of shares held (50$).<br />

•3 It was not until 1973 that the Tolbert-Administration announced<br />

•j a Liberianization policy which referred to an increasing<br />

I participation of Liberians in the qualified labour force of the<br />

•j multinational companies operating in the country. As will be<br />

•i discussed later in this Chapter this policy mainly served the<br />

| interests of the political elite of the country. <strong>The</strong> absence of<br />

a policy or a desire to co-operate with foreign investors in the<br />

management of the country's natural resources is further<br />

I evidenced by two cases in which the Government of Liberia is an<br />

important shareholder (50$) in the company which was granted<br />

concession rights. In both cases, viz., the exploitation of iron<br />

> ore in the Nimba Mountains and in the Bong Range respectively,<br />

the Government had agreed to be excluded from management<br />

I decisions (see Chapter 8). Co-ownership in both cases refers to<br />

! a legal structure on which income from this exploitation is<br />

j based rather than to a desire to co-operate with the foreign<br />

investor in order to develop its own ability and capacity to<br />

perform the role initially offered to foreign investors only<br />

j (as in the case of L.M.C). <strong>The</strong> factual exploitation of the<br />

i Mano River (iron ore) deposits by a foreign-owned management<br />

! company - though the concessionaire-company was 70$ Liberian<br />

i owned - is in this respect also significant (see Chapter 7).<br />

: Thirdly, that it had never been the intention of the Government<br />

j to promote an industrial co-operation which would make economic<br />

.: activities of foreign investors and of Liberian entrepeneurs<br />

j complementary. <strong>The</strong> economic and/or industrial activities of<br />

! foreign investors operating under concession agreements with the<br />

] Liberian Government were generally very limited and virtually<br />

j confined to (1) the extraction of natural resources (minerals,<br />

; logs) and their subsequent exportation, and (2) the production<br />

i of raw materials which were exported virtually unprocessed too<br />

(agricultural products such as rubber). Various examples justify<br />

j this conclusion, and involve all major investors.<br />

j Not only did the Government fail to link the economic activities<br />

j of foreign investors with those of national entrepeneurs but it<br />

I also showed to be unable or unwilling to change the enclave<br />

i character of the "foreign sector" of the Liberian economy. Thus<br />

I Liberia became just a supplier of raw materials for industries<br />

located abroad - for which not much trained'manpower is needed.<br />

One case, which has been dealt with extensively, showed that a<br />

foreign investor refused to co-operate with the Liberian<br />

Government in this respect by not being willing to install a<br />

rubber processing Industry (tyre factory) in the country. <strong>The</strong>

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