Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia - Jurusan Antropologi ...

SINGAPORE AND THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS 143
For its entire thirty-three years as an independent nation, Singapore has been
governed by the PAP. Consequently, the country’s political culture is largely
shaped by the ideology and practices of the PAP. From the start, the PAP
government had reined in the civil service to form a new alliance. The bureaucratic
and technocratic nature of the civil service was well suited to the task of
making good the political promise of economic growth through ‘rational
administration’ and ‘pragmatism’ (Chan 1975; Khong 1995). As economic plans
succeeded in leaps and bounds, it became increasingly difficult to challenge the
PAP government on ideological grounds; partly because it is difficult to argue
against success, and partly because ‘pragmatism’ as an ideology precluded a
consistent ideological component that could be defined and challenged (Chua 1995:
70). The political culture that developed is one that is defined by the government; it
is conservative and is organised consensually through networks of political agents
who share relatively uniform perceptions on the shape of the nation. This
uninterrupted hegemonic reign of the PAP has as one of its consequences the
engendering of political apathy across all social classes, each having different
reasons for it acquiescence.
In a 1992 survey by Mak and Leong (1994) on political attitudes and political
behaviour of Singaporeans, it was found that differences between middle and
working classes are marginal, with the middle class being slightly more ‘liberal’ in
attitude. For example, on the statement that there was a lack of readiness for
democracy in Singapore society, the same proportions of both classes agreed with
the statement; but, among those who disagreed, a greater proportion came from the
middle class. Middle-class respondents were also less likely to believe that a
challenge to the government is a threat to social order (see Table 5.3). The
overwhelming majority of respondents were shown to be politically inactive and
there was little difference between the two classes’ propensity to mobilise support
and/or campaign for political candidates (see Table 5.4). In spite of this inactivity,
respondents from both classes felt rather strongly that government should be
concerned with public opinions and that it matters that politics be democratic, even
if the government is doing a good job economically, that is they do not uncritically
prefer development over democratisation (see Table 5.3).
The absence of significant differences between the middle and working classes
renders political attitudes and behaviour ineffective as elements in the delineation of
cultural boundaries between different classes. This is not the case with
consumption.
BETWEEN GENERATIONS, ACROSS CLASSES:
CONSUMING YOUTH
Rapid expansion of education and economic opportunities, along with the changing
occupational structure over the past three decades (1965—95), have resulted in very
high rates of inter-generational upward social mobility among Singaporeans, which
is itself one of the planks of legitimacy of the government. Within the same family,