Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia - Jurusan Antropologi ...

SINGAPORE AND THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS 153
especially a movie industry with its parasitic tabloids and magazines. A second
factor is that the ruling PAP may have reinforced the suppression of public display
with its own code of ‘humility’ applied to its ministers, Members of Parliament and
party members. The ‘uniform’ for a national party convention and national day
celebration is alike: white shirt and white trousers, no tie. The usual working attire
does not include suits, which are reserved for formal meetings with foreign visitors;
even this is of relatively recent vintage, crafted to be more appropriate for
international consumption. Members of Parliament and junior ministers are known
to have given up luxury cars, leaving them for family use, and to have switched to
more humble makes. The rich who work closely with the government are thus
constrained in their appearance so as not to upstage the politicians.
The public absence of the rich as cultural consumers may have reduced the
pressure on the new middle class to engage in possible cycles of imitation. Thus,
the new middle class may become culturally self-satisfied without the pressure of
having to keep up with or imitate the rich, only to find that the rich have moved on
to greater heights or other terrains when they get there. This absence of the rich as
possible ‘cultural trendsetters’ may have helped the new middle class to accept
their realisation that it is ‘difficult to rise above it’ and that there is ‘little point to
struggle for more’ as Leong (1995) observes.
THE POLITICS OF THE LOWEST 20 PER CENT
In contrast to the rest of society, the lowest 20 per cent income group is highly
dependent on state provisions of housing, health care, education and public
transportation. Here, the use of consumption–which in this context is always
about excess rather than necessity–as a basis of class construction, is
inappropriate. Instead, the relations of the poor to the new middle class have to be
investigated via their dependency on state provisions. State provision of public goods
appeared to have been satisfactory to the lower-income electorate until the 1991
general election when, according to the PAP itself, a substantial quantum of lowincome
people, particularly Chinese, voted against the Party. Their dissatisfaction
apparently arose from difficulties in meeting the rising cost of living, which some
attributed to government efforts to privatise some public services, such as
hospitals. Since then the government has put in place a fund of several billion
dollars, targeted for general distribution, to be used in such programmes as
Edusave (a scholarship fund for students from poor families) and Medifund (to aid
families who are unable to meet their own medical costs, especially the elderly).
The most spectacular welfare increase is in additional housing subsidies for the
poor. These include the ‘small family scheme’ in which the government will help
low-income households in rental flats to purchase their own flats. 13 In addition, a
cash subsidy of $30,000 is granted to families with less than $1,200 monthly income.
Finally, as part of the government’s strategy of using the family as the first line of
mutual assistance, a sum of $30,000 is granted to families who choose to relocate
closer to their parents. 14