Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia - Jurusan Antropologi ...

268 SALIM LAKHA
and merit. Significantly, these discussions and debates are not confined to Indians
in India. Participants in the debates also include diasporic Indians who express
their views at different forums, including on the internet. One may add that
meritocracy is now an important dimension of the discourse of the globally
oriented upper-caste middle class.
The situation is further complicated by religious antipathy between some Hindus
and Muslims. Like caste, religion is an important dimension of middle-class identity.
This has been highlighted particularly since the religious and sectarian tensions
and violence associated with the demolition of the mosque in Ayodhya in
December 1992, and the rise of the BJP as a political force, especially in north
India, from around the late 1980s. The BJP, whose ideology and agenda are
associated with militant Hindu nationalism, is notable for the support it has
attracted from upper-caste, middle-class Hindus in rural and urban areas (Basu et
al. 1993:80, 88—9, 92; Desai 1996:81—2; Chandra 1996: 85). 21 The support for the
BJP in north India is explained by a variety of factors which include the party’s
origins in the north; its projection as a party of unity, set against the divisions and
corruption in some other major parties; the party’s criticism of Western economic
and cultural domination through globalisation; 22 and its ideology of Hindutva,
emphasising unity of Hindus and the nation at a time when upper-caste dominance
is challenged by low-and middle-caste groups.
Hindutva, which regards religious and national identities as synonymous, is an
important dimension of upper-caste, middle-class identity. Importantly, the appeal
of Hindutva is transnational. Many diasporic Hindus are also influenced by Hindu
nationalism through the activities of the BJP and its associate organisations, such
as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) (World Hindu Council) and Rashtriya
Swyamsewak Sangh which are engaged in cultural and religious dissemination
overseas (Basu et al. 1993:78; Radhakrishnan 1996: xxix). The transnational
character of ethnic and religious identities, however, is not confined to the Hindus.
Sikhs and Muslims residing overseas have been similarly influenced by their
respective religious and political organisations (van der Veer 1994:114—15, 128—
30). In the case of diasporic Hindus, many were clearly involved in the dispute over
the mosque in Ayodhya. For example, donations were collected from local and
diasporic Hindus from 1984 onwards for the bricks required to construct a temple
on the site of the mosque in Ayodhya (Davis 1996:40—1), and verbal and other
support was extended by diasporic Hindus to aid the movement of religious
nationalism in India after the demolition of the mosque in 1992. For the foundation
of the temple at Ayodhya, the stones contributed by diasporic Hindus were most
conspicuously displayed in order to highlight the transnational bases of Hindu
nationalism (van der Veer 1994:4).
A distinctive feature of the contemporary Indian middle class, therefore, is its
growing inclination to cultural chauvinism. In large part, this unites new rich, uppercaste
Hindus with some elements in the wider Hindu middle class, but
marginalises the Muslims. In contrast to the pre-independence anti-colonial
nationalism of some of the old bourgeoisie and middle class, substantial sections of