Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia - Jurusan Antropologi ...

214 STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY IN URBAN CHINA
used here, their world remains largely invisible to the quantitative researcher. But
using survey data has the advantage of allowing us to describe the broader
patterns of change occurring in urban Chinese society, and to assess the relative
importance of different kinds of capital in getting ahead.
In terms of occupational, educational and income attributes, the respondents in
this survey provide a representative sample of the population of China’s largest
cities. A significant proportion of the population are in administrative and
professional jobs (16 per cent and 19 per cent respectively), but most of the
population is either in manual and production jobs (39 per cent) or in clerical and
other routine non-manual positions (26 per cent). 2 In terms of education, Beijing
has a disproportionately large number of tertiary-educated people, with 13 per cent
of those surveyed having university degrees, and a further 16 per cent having tertiarycollege
(dazhuan) qualifications. But most people surveyed possessed a secondarylevel
education (55 per cent). Table 8.2 shows income attainment according to sex,
education, occupational class, work unit and political status. There are a number of
patterns present in this table which provide some indication of what helps in
‘making it’ in present-day Beijing. Males earn significantly more than females.
Contrary to earlier speculation that economic reform had inverted the relationship
between education and income–providing higher incomes to those with lower
educations–it is clear, at least as of 1994, that increased education also increased
income. Those with university (659 yuan) or graduate education (923) earn
significantly more than those with senior-secondary (484) or junior-secondary (434)
education. 3 But there are also major disparities between earnings in the new
private and individually owned businesses and state-owned work units. Table 8.2
further indicates that in Beijing political resources remain an important socialeconomic
advantage–Party members (620 yuan) earn more than non-Party
members (475).
It is also evident from the data that the distribution of income is skewed towards
the lower levels: 76 per cent of respondents reported total monthly incomes of 700
yuan or less. At the other end of this scale are the relatively small number of highincome
earners who are the focus of this chapter. For the purposes of the following
analysis, I classify the ‘new rich’ as those with reported monthly incomes of 1,000
yuan and above: they constitute 6.5 per cent of those surveyed. Those on ‘middle
incomes’, with between 500 and 999 yuan a month, make up 33.1 per cent of the
sample; and those on ‘lower incomes’, with between zero and 499 yuan a month,
make up 60.3 per cent. Although in relative terms 1,000 yuan may not seem a great
deal of money, the rationale for selecting those above this income level as ‘new
rich’ is that there are many non-pecuniary benefits attached to urban jobs–
inexpensive housing, benefits such as cheap medical care, and possibly, for the
lucky few, a car. Thus 1,000 yuan is enough money to assume a lifestyle or status
that is significantly different from that of the rest of the population. 4
This income stratum can be defined as ‘new rich’ in the context of socialist
China, because an ‘old rich’ largely ceased to exist in China after 1949: although
certain status groups, such as government officials, enjoyed considerable political