Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia - Jurusan Antropologi ...

JIM OCKEY 245
tentatively question the role of the middle class in the uprising, yet the
focus remains on ‘the middle class’. Sungsidh (1993), for example, writes of the
reasons why unionised labour did not join the uprising, before writing briefly of the
role of slum dwellers. Voravidh (1993:139) points out that many of the dead and
injured were not middle-class, but concludes: ‘The victory of democratic forces is
not possible if it lacks the support and the combat that comes from the middle
class’. Nithi (1993) reminds us that the middle class does not necessarily believe in
either democracy or equality, as Anderson and others had pointed out after the
1976 massacre, a point recent constructions of the middle class have largely
ignored. Perhaps most intriguing is the article by Teeranat (1993), who points out
that by most definitions, including those of family background and income, the
military who fired on the demonstrators are also middle class. Yet, ultimately even
the more sophisticated analyses in this book credit ‘the middle class’ with the
uprising of 1992.
In the construction of the events of 1992, we see coming together all the strands
of the analysis presented here. The 1992 uprising is the first popular uprising in
Thailand where an awareness of the middle class had already developed, and thus
the first time an uprising was attributed to it from the outset. The uprising was
associated constantly with the earlier uprisings, seen by scholars as the ideological
touchstone for determining membership of the middle class. The military, despite
its arguably middle-class status or structural position, was not considered part of
the middle class, since it took the wrong side in the conflict. Yet retired military
officer Lt.-Gen. Chamlong Simuang, who led the protestors, was considered
middle-class. In contrast to previous uprisings, the middle class associated with the
events of 1992 was also identified in terms of lifestyle and consumer goods,
particularly the automobile and the mobile phone, in an attempt to connect the new
rich to the political ideological preferences of those in academe and the media.
Finally, in the academic and media constructions of events, the ‘middle class’
becomes so dominant that the role of others in the 1992 uprising disappears, and
they are denied any credit.
The middle class did play an important role in the 1992 uprising by providing
leadership, yet when fighting erupted, they were not in the forefront. 16 The
occupational backgrounds of those killed and those injured have been documented
in 100 Wan Wirachon Prachathipatai (1992:3—5, 8). On the basis of the information
available, only one of the 38 dead was a business person, one a government
employee, one a teacher, and one an engineer. At least 20 belonged to lower
classes, 4 more were vendors and 10 were students. Even more telling: of the 34
about whom information is available, not one had graduated from a university. Of
the 176 injured about whom information is available, only 23 clearly belonged, in
socio-economic terms, to the middle or upper classes, though some of the others
may, by some definitions, have belonged to a lower middle class. Yet most
constructions of the uprising, with the notable exception of Nithi’s (above), ignore
these figures, referring instead to an earlier survey that identified 52 per cent of
demonstrators as having a degree.