Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia - Jurusan Antropologi ...

CULTURAL RELATIONS AND THE NEW RICH 25
odds with the leisured extravagance of the aristocracy. His legendary feats are not
only celebrated in the West; they also constitute a powerful reference point for
politicians, business associations and intellectuals campaigning for, or seeking to
explain, rapid economic growth in parts of Asia. Today his frugality, independence
and industriousness have been transposed into the Confucianism or Asian Values
of the collective Oriental capitalist. Despite the powerful image, it is doubtful
whether such a historical personage ever characterised the capitalist classes of
Europe, or of contemporary Asia.
In Europe, not only were many of those who invested in capitalist industry from
prosperous landed aristocratic families, but others who entered from the middle
layers of society commonly tried to use industrial success to follow in the footsteps
of the nobility. Not only did many seek the security of rents over profits, but they
also sought out aristocratic titles, or at least an aristocratic lifestyle of conspicuous
wealth (Neale 1985:73; Pilbeam 1990:8—11, 14). Wallerstein (1988:101) argues
simply, that on both economic and status grounds: ‘the primary objective of every
bourgeois is to become an aristocrat’. He suggests that the distortion embedded in
the popular image of the European capitalist arose because theorists derived the
personal character of the capitalist from the systemic character of capitalism,
rather than from the human beings who constituted what was then referred to
variously as the bourgeoisie and middle class (cf. Pilbeam 1990:1—4). Something
similar seems to be taking place today in relation to the Newly Industrialising
Countries of Asia, except that here the capitalist is given an Oriental profile,
reflecting the shifting spatial centre of capitalist production, and a global discourse
preoccupied with cultural difference. 31
While the systemic forces of capitalism may have inhibited the shift from profits
to rents–the preference that Wallerstein (1988:101—3) attributes to the successful
capitalist–the pursuit of status rewards has always been given freer rein. With the
decline in the availability and value of formal aristocratic titles, other vehicles for
status recognition have been pursued by the bourgeoisie in the West, among them
the acquisition of former aristocratic properties and prestigious family names. But
increasingly, capitalism has produced its own rewards, most immediately in the
way of a growing supply of luxury consumer goods and associated lifestyles.
Two important shifts in the productive and organisational character of capitalism
have affected the status relations of class. Because these shifts have been global in
character, they have been as much a part of the contemporary experience of
capitalist development in Asia as in the West. The first is the substantial growth of
a new middle class, comprising highly educated salaried professionals, technical
specialists, managers and administrators who assume powerful positions in the
running and servicing of large corporations and state agencies (Burris 1986). The
growth of this new middle class, possessing high levels of formal education but not,
for the most part, capital, has elevated the importance of educational credentials as
a status marker, and deepened the apparent veracity of meritocracy as a system
for ranking people (see Sennett and Cobb 1972).