Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia - Jurusan Antropologi ...

CULTURAL RELATIONS AND THE NEW RICH 21
making attributes as exploitative and disadvantageous to indigenous Filipinos
(Pinches). Some, in positions of political or bureaucratic power, have seen Chinese
new wealth as presenting them with a rightful opportunity to enrich themselves
further, through the quasi-noble or ethno-national privileges associated with state
office.
This latter stance has been more evident in Malaysia and Indonesia, where,
historically, anti-Chinese sentiments have been stronger than in the Philippines. In
both countries, many indigenous politicians, bureaucrats and rising wealthy
entrepreneurs have used state privileges to establish advantageous business links
with wealthy Chinese capitalists (Shamsul, Heryanto). Notwithstanding the
accusations of corruption that are sometimes levelled at them, these indigenous
operators have also been highly influential in promoting ethno-nationalist
ideologies in which they are located at the forefront of national development.
These ideologies invoke not only the nationalist cause of Malays and pribumi
Indonesians in the era of independence, but also an ethos of pre-colonial and
colonial times, when the state was the major vehicle for economic enrichment. A
major proponent of ‘Asian Values’ as the measure of the region’s new wealth and
non-Western cultural identity is Malaysia’s prime minister, Dr Mahathir, whose
government’s New Economic Policy (NEP) has been explicitly directed against
what many Malays see as the dominance of the ethnic Chinese in the nation’s
economy. From the popular Malay vantage point, the economic success that has
come with the NEP era represents a nationalist victory over circumstances which
previously assigned the country, and its indigenous people, to the position of
economic backwater, the direct result of European and Chinese exploitation
(Shamsul).
While many new-rich Malays have acquired their wealth through ‘money
politics’, the most numerous of them, and the main carriers of Malay
ethnonationalism, are the first generation of educated salaried managers and
professionals. As is the case elsewhere in the region, they represent a significant
departure from the old indigenous middle class, who were based in the state
bureaucracy. Their emergence in the corporate sector reflects not only the
structural reorganisation of Malaysia’s and the region’s economy, but also a
cultural shift from a civil service ethos to one that is business-oriented (Smith). Just
as modern Confucianist ideology represents a significant departure from the earlier
form, with the elevation of the capitalist to a position of high honour, so has there
been a shift in the meaning of Malayness. While the new rich may be appropriating
an idealised version of Malay peasant life (Kahn 1992), many are also living lives
of increased privatisation and class exclusivity, largely removed from the
patronage bonds that not long ago would have tied them to their home villages
(Smith). New-rich Malays are also playing a leading role in linking Malay identity
more strongly with Islam, through heightened religious piety and participation in
the Dakwa movement (Shamsul, Smith). As with Confucianism and Chinese
ethnicity, capitalist development in Malaysia has brought with it a transformation in