SCHRIFTENREIHE SCHIFFBAU Festschrift anlässlich des 100 ...

� Due to the interlocking of the visor and the ramp just behind it, it is very likely that the
visor pulled the ramp open as it fell down.
� Many survivors heard a scraping sound just after the heavy blows from the bow, as the
ship run over the visor, which could not sink fast enough not to be hit by the advancing
ship bow.
� The scenario of the visor and ramp being loose, let’s say both about 1 m open, is not
likely to be the main flooding scenario for the vehicle deck. The inflow rate appears to be
too small for this. This implies that the visor dropped off relatively early and did not hang
on the vessel until the ship heeled to near or over 90°.
� The three crew members in the ECR were the last persons who saw the bow ramp
closed during the initial phase of the accident. Therefore their testimonies are important
for re-constructing the course of events. Based on the survivors’ testimonies, the results
of the evacuation simulations, and the approximate casualty rates of passengers on each
deck it is concluded here that the crew members must have left the ECR earlier than
reported by themselves and also by the JAIC. The events they describe in their
testimonies thus took place earlier than reported by the JAIC. With this interpretation of
the testimonies from the ECR the conflict between them and on the other hand the
testimonies of other survivors and the results of the analysis carried out in this study
could be to great extent removed.
� The Third Engineer C36 saw in a monitor in the ECR water coming in at the sides of the
almost closed ramp about two to four minutes after the two heavy blows were generally
heard on the ship. It was concluded in Chapter 1.5 that the closed ramp was last time
observed by the Third Engineer around 00:58-01:01, which is at a very early phase of the
accident. It is very likely that the ramp opened very soon after this time.
� After the visor fell the vessel advanced straight ahead approximately 2-3 minutes on its
original course until it turned to port. During this time a large amount of water flowed onto
the vehicle deck onto both sides of the center casing and the ship heeled to starboard. It
is likely that there was water on vehicle deck already before the visor fell off.
� When water was sloshing on the vehicle deck, limited amounts of water could flow down
on to Deck 1 through the staircases in the front part of the center casing already at early
phases of the accident, as reported by the survivors. The sudden heel to starboard
probably contributed to this.
� In view of this early water flow on to Deck 1 through the center casing, the assumption of
damage deeper down on the hull as a cause for the water on Deck 1 appears
superfluous.
� A relatively high speed is needed to cause a sufficient amount of water to flow onto the
vehicle deck in order for the first sudden heel to appear in the simulated ship roll motion.
The speed of 14.2 kn or higher was needed in the computations with the program HSVA
ROLLS to cause the first sudden heel to appear.
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