Schoeck_2010_EnvyATheoryOfSocialBehaviour.pdf

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INGRATITUDE 203
peoples, is unwilling to admit that the recipients of its welfare, for
reasons that are obvious, deeply envy and hate the givers and, in extreme
cases, live only in the hope of the latter's destruction. Kant then goes on:
'Ingratitude towards a benefactor which, if taken to the point of hatred
of that benefactor, is qualified ingratitude, but otherwise is termed
thoughtlessness, though it is generally held to be a very dreadful vice;
yet it is so notorious in man that to make an enemy as a result of
benefactions rendered is not regarded as improbable. '
How can this discovery have been lost from sight so completely that,
since 1950, the West has supposed that foreign policy could be superseded
by development aid to the 'Third World'? One mentions this
simply in order to show that we cannot afford to ignore the problems of
envy.
What is significant in Kant's description is the remark that 'indeed, in
the public view it is a vice greatly abhorred. ' No one admits publicly, and
hence public opinion does not admit, that ingratitude is the norm. It is
astounding that countless benefactors allow themselves to be persuaded
over and over that ingratitude with the resultant hatred is a rare and
special case. It could be that by ignoring ingratitude many benefactors
are able to repress in themselves a consciousness of their own envy of
someone else. If a person were to admit that the recipients of his welfare
were in fact envious of him, he would be forced to recognize that his own
ambivalent feelings towards benefactors might be something as contemptible
as envy and hatred. Since most people are both recipient and
benefactor they retain a memory of earlier benefactions, which may
cause the benefactor to harbour ambivalent feelings throughout his life.
How, then, does Kant explain the constant recurrence of ingratitude?
The reason that such a vice is possible lies in the misunderstanding of a
man's duty towards himself, in that he imagines, because the benefactions of
others subject him to an obligation, that he does not need them; nor will he
ask for them, but bear the burdens of life alone, rather than put them upon
others and thus become indebted to them: for he fears that by doing so he
will sink to the level of client in relation to his patron, and this is repugnant
to true self-esteem.
Thus, according to Kant, uninhibited gratitude is possible only
towards those (ancestors, parents) whose benefactions cannot but pre-