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Schoeck_2010_EnvyATheoryOfSocialBehaviour.pdf

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366 IS OWNERSHIP THEFT?<br />

groups, and the stronger is this envy of others, the heavier must be the<br />

tax. ,3<br />

Mishan continues that according to Duesenberry, who speaks for<br />

many like-minded people, there can be a situation of 'excessive' income<br />

in which<br />

any net increase of output-for instance, more of 'every' good without<br />

additional effort-will not advance the welfare of the community no matter<br />

how it is distributed. Indeed, any increase of output makes the community<br />

worse off, since, no matter how the additional goods are distributed, the<br />

additional envy generated cannot be adequately compensated for out of<br />

these extra goods. 4<br />

Mishan, who uses the term 'envy' three times on the same page, is,<br />

however, critical of this view. In his opinion, there might be a distribution<br />

of additional goods, made available without any additional effort,<br />

which, in spite of evident envy, would improve the position of everyone<br />

in the society. Yet if this book has successfully demonstrated that it is<br />

envy's nature to be on principle wholly intractable to quantitative manipulations,<br />

the fallibility of welfare economics is even more evident.<br />

Yet Mishan does allow welfare economics some prospect of success in<br />

that they take account of the envious:<br />

Indeed, not only does an income tax correct for social envy, this envy<br />

itself is reduced in so far as it is provoked by disposable rather than gross<br />

incomes. The more sensitive [Le., more envious] is the community in this<br />

respect, the steeper the progression of the tax necessary to correct the<br />

conventional conditions. In extreme cases only complete equality of disposable<br />

incomes solves the problem of interdependent welfares. In the<br />

nature of things, so extreme an institution is more likely to be encountered<br />

in an opulent society than in an indigent one. 5<br />

3 B. J. Mishan, 'A Survey of Welfare Economics, 1939-1959,' The Economic Journal<br />

(London) Vol. LXX, June 1960, p. 247.<br />

40p. cit., pp. 247 f. Mishan refers to J. S. Duesenberry, Income, Saving, and the<br />

Theory of Consumer Behavior, Cambridge (Mass.), 1949.<br />

5 E. J. Mishan, op. cit., p. 254.

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