Freedom, Society, and State - Ludwig von Mises Institute

qui tel 0 g i c a I I y con c Iudedt hat s 0 ve rei gn t y wa s the
creator, the sine qua non, of society. WithoMt the
state, said Hobbes in his most famous passage, the life
of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."
Since order required that all power be centralized
i nthestate the r e co u I d ben 0 room for ind e penden t
associations. Associations could only undermine the
unity of power required for peace and order.(33) Thus
the Church, the ·university, and even the family fall
vi ct im to Hobbes t sover e ign. But it is important to
rea liz e t hat for Hobbe s sovere i gn t y wa s not an end i n
its elf but was ne c e s a r y, as Ni s bet po i n t sout, topr 0vide
a secure and "impersonal environment of law within
which individuals may pursue rationally their proper
interests." And far from infringing upon individual
freedom Hobbes bel i eved that sovereignty and freedom
went hand- in-hand. The sovereign state was the agent
for the liberation of the individual from the petty
tyrannies of "church, guild or any other form of intermediate
association." Thus while Hobbes believed that
the state was the creator of society he did not endeavor
to abolish the distinction between the two.
I twa s R 0 u sse a u who, r e cogn i z i ng t hat rna n t s ps y ­
chological need for attachment conflicted with the impersonality
of Hobbes' Leviathan, preceeded with such
an abolition. Like Hobbes, Rousseau desired the liberat
ion of man from the constraints fo traditional society.
And also like Hobbes, he recognized that this required
a powerful and highly centralized state. It is
the cognition of this fact that makes explicable
R 0 u sseau' sotherwi s e pa r adox i ca I r ema r k t hat rna n i s t 0
be "forced to be free." But if the atomization of society,
as Hobbes knew, was a necessary condition for
sovereignty, and if sovereignty, as he believed was a
n e c e s s a rye 0 n d i t ion for soc i a lorder, i t wa s not, as
Roussea'u fully realized, a sufficient condition. For
per hap s the m0 S t fun dam e n t a I 0 f rna n 's ps yc hoi 0 g i ca I
nee dsis the nee d t 0 bel 0 ng, to fee I a pa r t 0 f some ­
thing. Thus, if sovereignty demanded destruction of
all intermediate associations, something would have to
be sub s tit utedin the i r p I ace. Ro us sea u 0 f fer e d as the
funct ional equivalent of membership in the plurality of
independent and autonomous associations membership in
the monolithic, overarching political community;
membership, that is, in the total state.(34)
It is therefore in the writings of Rousseau in the
eighteenth century that one fInds a description of the
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