Freedom, Society, and State - Ludwig von Mises Institute

then adds that "since there is no government, there is
no law." Consequently, individualist anarehism "would
simply be a war -- civil war --among various groups
holding different convictions."(2) And Richard Wheeler
argues that in the absence of a legal order "there is
nome a n s b y wh i c h the cond i t ions t hat cons tit ute the f t
can be established other than on the basis of individual
arbitrary whim. In such a society any and all definitions
of what constitutes one's property can claim
e qua I val i d i t y, and theref 0 r e node fin i ti 0 n 0 f proper ty
rights in such a society has any validity whatsoever."
Thus, "if no rights are possible without property
r· i g h t s, and no pro per t y rig h t s .are pos siblewi thou t
legal i ty -- then in a. society that dispenses with legali
t y, suehas t hat a d v 0 cat e d by free rna r ke t anarchism,
no rights are possible."(3) Peter Crosby maint
a ins t hat nthe d i I emma for the a narchistis t hat itis
o n I yin the con t ex t 0 f a s ystem 0 f pr i rna r y law t hat a
case for the connection between profits and morality
can bedeve lop e d • On e migh t even a r g ue t hat the ve r y
point of a legal system is to make sure that crime
doesn't pay." But, "since the anarchist eschews all
talk of law; constitutional, statutory or even common,"
there is "no way to legally guarantee anything."(4)
The result would be chaos and/or despotism.
This would indeed be a devastating criticism of
individualist anarchism. The problem, however, is that
far from oppos ing law, one finds continual references
in individualist anarchist literature to "natural law,"
"objective law," "common law," the "libertarian law
cod e ," etc. ( 5 ) What the a narchi s t soppose i s not 1aw
but legislation. Not only do they recognize the crucial
importance of the rule of law but one of their
arguments is that legislation itself constitutes a
violation of a true rule of law. The rule of law, as
we have seen,. is intended to eliminate the arbitrary
use of violence. But, the Tannehills argue that the
dilemma of legislation is that it must make laws that
are universally applicable and inflexible on the one
hand, and flexible enough to apply to a wide range of
cases on the other. Insofar as they are inflexible,
men wi II of t en be convicted or released not on the intent
of the law but on "nothing more than the technical
interpretation of an obscure wording in some statute."
But, insofar as the legi slat ion is flexible, the law
becomes simply a grant of arbitrary power to be used at
the discretion of the agent. Thus legislation is
caught, or so it is argued, on the horns of a dilemma.
The rule of law IS supposed to guide the individual in
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