Freedom, Society, and State - Ludwig von Mises Institute

the moral duty, of all other children, and
all other persons, to assist the injured party
in defending his rights, and redressing
his wr ongs. These are fundamental pr inciples
of natural rights which govern the most imp
0 r tan t t ran sac t ion s 0 f rna n wit h rna n • Yet
children learn them earlier than they learn
t hat t h r e e and t h r e ear e six, or' five and
five are ten. Their childish plays, even,
c 0 u 1 d not be car r i e don wit h0 uta cons tan t
regard to them; and itis equally impossible
for persons of any age to live together in
peace on any other conditions.(70) .
"If justice be not a natural principle," he continued,
"then there is no such thing as injustice; and all the
crimes of which the world has been the scene, have been
no crimes at all; but only simple events, like the
fall ing of the rain ••." But if, on the other hand,
justice was a natural principle, then "it is necessarily
an immutable one; and can no more be changed -- by
any power i n fer i 0 r tothat wh i c h esta b lished i t - - t han
can the law of gravitation, the laws of light, the
principles of mathematics, or any other natural law or
principle whatever."(7l)
Co n seq uen t 1y, all huma n 1e g i s 1a t i on , so I on g as i t
was in violation of natural law, was morally null and
void and was legally nothing more than "an absurdity, a
unsurpation, and a crime." If every man had a natural
right to the fruit of his labor then, Spooner believed,
he had a natural right to the fruit of his labor; and
i twa s jus t a s mu c h rob b e r y for any rna n, 0 r g r 0 up 0 f
men, even if they call themselves "government" and
the irac t i v i tie s "t a x a t ion ," tota k e a I lor pa r t 0 f
another's property, without the latter's consent, as if
i t weret a ken by a common highwayman. S im i 1a r 1y, if a
man was only under obligation to perform duties to
which he freely consented, then he was under obligation
only to perform duties to which he freely consented;
and no man or group of men, even if they called themselves
"government," could impose upon him any additional
obligations. This meant, as he pointed out in
No Treason, Number One, all "governments, if they can
rightfully exist at all, can exist only by consent,"
i • e ., "t h e i n d i v i d uale 0 n sen t 0 f eve r y rna n . . . ( 7 2 )
In No Treason, Number Six, Spooner further argued
that since no group of men, however numerous, was able
to bind .another group of men, however small, then in
like manner, no generation of men could bind a succeedi
n g g e n era t ion . Conseq uen t 1y, the Co n s tit uti 0 nco u 1d
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