Freedom, Society, and State - Ludwig von Mises Institute

pol icy. But this, of course, is not' history at all; it
is merely dogma.
What 0 f the nob j e c t i ve n e v idenee? Ha ve Am e rican
i n t e r v e n t ion s c 0 inc ided wit h Ame rica n bus i ne ssint e r ­
ests? Once again, the evidence provides little support
of the theory. In fact, argues Slater, "There is no
case in which it can persuasively be argued that Washi
n g ton res 0 r t edt 0 serious covert political action or
the us.e 0 far me d .for ceon beha I f 0 f pr ivateeconom i c
interests as such."(45) Korea and Vietnam, America's
two majorpost-1945 wars, cannot be explained by economi
c factors. Both were immensely costly in both human
and material terms. Yet neither nation possessed
e i the r i ndis pens a b 1eraw rna t e riaIsor the 1ureof grea t
markets. The same is true of such interventions as
Laos, Cambodia, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala.
New Left historians like Williams are aware of the diff
i cui t y and h a vet r i edt 0 res cue the i r pos i t i on by
claiming that such economically counterproductive interventions
were necessary to preserve the capitalist
system as a whole. But as Slater points out "a theory
t hat iss 0 b r 0 ad t hat i tis c a pableof 'exp I a i n ing ,
bot h A and its 0 P P os i te B (i n t e r ven t i on and non in t e rv
e n t ion, i n t e r v e n t ion t hat i sec0 nom i c a I I Y prod uc t i ve
and i n t e r ve n t ion t hat isec0 n om i c a I 1Y cos t I y). • • i s no
theory at all, but simplydogma."(46)
Moreover, many cases which appear on the surface
to 'be in conformi ty wi th the theory do not hold up
un d e r dee per a n a I y sis • I tis we 11 known t hat in the
ear ly 1950's the CIA played a major role in undermining
the Mossedegh government in Iran and restoring the
Shah. A popular explanation of this is that the CIA
intervened because Mossedegh had nationalized foreignown
e d 0 i I hoi din gsin 1 9 5 1 • But s eve r a I t h i n gs rna ke
this scarcely credible. First, Iran continued to receive
substantial American foreign aid throughout 1952,
eve n afterna t ionali z a t ion. And sec 0 nd, the r e we r e
n 0 Arne ric a n - 0 wned 0 i 1 compan i esin I ran a t t his time •
Thus, intervention could not have occurred to protect
Am e ric a n bus i n e s sin t ere s t s • I n fa c t, sinc e Am erica
was an oil exporter at this time, the cut off of
Iranian oil shipments proved to be a boon for American
oil interests. What actually precipi tated the CIA move
was Washington's increasing unease at Iran's leftward
drift, symbolized by the signing of an oil sale agreement
wi th Eastern European countries. Washington felt
i t e sse n t i a 1 t hat a s tab 1e, non c omm un i s t I ran be pre ­
served. 'It should also be pointed out that the restor-
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