Freedom, Society, and State - Ludwig von Mises Institute

such "selective perception of mutual coercion," Samuels
maintains, "that the anarchist ideal is sensible -- and
that selectivity begs the critical issues."(19)
Rot h bar d's de fin i t ion 0 f power and f r e e d om in
t e r ms 0 f p h Ysic a I v i ole nee com e sin for es p e cia 1 1Y
c a u s tic c r i tic ism • " Con C e n t rat ion up 0 n ph Ysica I v i 0lence
and obedience is an undue narrowing of the focus
upon the full range of mutual coercion," he charges.
Rothbard's "nonaggression axiom" is "misleading and
s e lee t i ve wit h reg a r d to' invas ion s ' • " He" can on I y
pretend to abolish invasions by selectively admitting
them, i.e., (he) abolished only certain invasions and
coercion." And what invasions would Rothbard's axiom
abol ish? Since his conception of voluntarism and freedom
are "specified only in terms of market exchange,"
the y are "i n compIetean d s e I e c t i ve • " T hus"Ro t h bard's
system" says Samuels, "would permit the operation of
mu t u a I c 0 e r c ion i nthe rna r ke t, but he doe s not see i t
as pejoratively and analytically coercion. In other
words, he would abolish only the coercion he is willing
to acknowledge."(20) Given his arbitrarily narrow view
of power, Samuels continues, Rothbard cannot see -- or
a tIe a s two n 't ad mit - - t hat the rna r ke t s y stem isits
elf co ere i ve and t hat "i t g i v e s e f f e c t to wh ate ve r
structure of private power operates through it." Thus,
the "s tat e I e s s n e s s If 0 faRo t hba r d ian soc i e t y is a me r e
"pretense"; it IS a "play with words" that "only functions
to mislead." Consequently, not only would there
be the functional equivalent of a state but it would be
a state "skewed in favor of a propertied elite."
Rothbard's "anarchism" "is not anarchism but a cleverly
designed and worded surrogate for elitist or aristocratic
con s e r vat ism. " I t wo u I d res u I tin a "p1 utoeraey"
in the truest sense of the word, and "it cannot claim
attent ion as a work of serious scholarship." In brief,
"there is more to coercion, to voluntarism, and to
freedom than Rothbard's system admits," and it is only
by his "spur i ous" and, Samuel s strongly impl ies conscious
"sleight-of-hand of narrowly contemplating ext
ern a lit i e sandinvas ion s" t hat he i s a blet 0 sol vethe
spector of power in his society.(21)
This is a stinging critiCIsm that, despite its
truculent and polemical tone, does raise an important
question: is the Rothbardian -- and more generally the
lIbertarian -- resolution of the power problem simply a
product of the (conscious?) abuse of the language; of a
semantic sleight-of-hand?
231