Freedom, Society, and State - Ludwig von Mises Institute

Second, SInce one can define a concept in any way
one desires, it is technically meaningless to speak of
the "correctness" of a definition. But to be understandable
a definition must bear some congruence with
the way the term is commonly used. It would be ridiculous
to define power in terms of, say, the length of
one's shoe laces. But within this limit the ambiguity
surrounding the term provides one with fairly wide discretion
to st.ipulate a particular definition. Rothbard's
definition of power in terms of physical violen
c e c e r t a i n I y f a I I s wit h i ntheli mit S 0 f commo n
usa g e • For, a s Da h I not e s aftera c knowledging the
ambiguity of the term, "probably among all people"
physical violence such as "exile, imprisonment and
death would be considered as severe punishment."(29)
Da hId 0 e s not lim i t power tot heseac t s as Ro t hbar d
does. But his statement, if correct, does indicate
that the acts that Rothbard denotes as violent are the
ones that everyone can agree as being powerful. One
can disagree with this definition of power and, given
the s tip u I a t i ve asp e c t 0 f de fin i t ion s, i t wo u I d be
poi n tIesst 0 a r g u e t hat Ro t h ba r d's de fin i t ion is the
"only correct" one. But it certainly must be admitted
to be a correct and plausible use of the term.(30) It
is therefore highly unfair to argue, as does Samuels,
that Rothbard's definition of power is an abuse of
language and a (consciously) misleading semantic
sleight-of-hand. On the contrary, H. E. Frech, who is
otherwise critical of Rothbard, applauds him for "excellently
sharpening the language," precisely in the
ambiguous area of power relationships.(31)
We are now ina pos i t ion to fIe s h ou t the r ema ining
elements of what may be termed the Rothbardian influence
taxonomy. While power has been defined as the
use of violence, we have not distinguished between its
legitimate and illegitimate uses. Yet Rothbard does
draw such a distinction. For him, as for Tucker and
the philosophical anarchists, the initiated use of
power is illegitimate, while its defensive use is
legitimate. This fits perfectly with the Dahl-
.L 8 ssw e I I - K a p I 8 nap pro a c h, wh i c h a Iso rna kesthis distinction
between the legitimate and IllegItimate uses
of power. Power that "is said to be legitimate," -however
that term may be defined -- notes Dahl, is
"generally called authority," while that which is saId
to be illegitimate is referred to as "coercion."
The Rothbardlan influence taxonomy can now be
summarIzed as follows:
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