Freedom, Society, and State - Ludwig von Mises Institute

obtained the declaration of the general will.
When, therefore, the opinion opposed to my
ow n pre va i Is, t hat s imp I y shows t ha t I wa s
mistaken; and that what I considered to be
the general will was not so. Had my private
opinion prevai led, I should have done something
other than I wished; and in that case I
should not have been free.(13)
The tot a lis m 0 f bot h P I at 0 and B.ous s ea u is ev iden
t. Both see order as intr icately connected wi th and
indispensable for the common good; both see a vigorous
state with extensive regulations as necessary for
order. Thus, the state becomes the sine qua non of
the common good. Anytime the "private good" conflicts
wi t h the "common good" the former must yield. To rei terate
Plato's remark in the Crito, "you must do whatever
(the state) commands."
b. The personalist common good.
A s 1 i g h t 1Y d ifferen t ve r s ion 0 f the C omm 0 n goodis
presented by the Thomist philosopher, Jacques Maritain.
Be i n gaThom i s t, Mar ita inac c e p t s Ar i s tot 1e f s d i c t urn
that man is a social animal. Not only the good life
but survival itself is possible only in a social context.
This raises the question: "Does society exist
for each one of us, or does each one of us exist for
soc i e t y ? n ( 1 4 ) Any if u nil ate r a 1 an swe r ," Me. r ita i n r e ­
plies, would lead to either chaos, as in the former
case, or totalitarianism, as in the latter. What is
r e qui red i s wh a the c a I Isa" b i I ate r a 1 an s w e r • "
Maritain distinguishes between the "individual" and
the "p e r son 0 If The i nd i v i d ua lis but "a f r a gmen t 0 f the
species, a part of the universe."(15) Since the whole
is, by definition, more important than its individual
components, the "individual" has value only as it contributes
to the "good of the whole," i.e., only as a
means. Thus, the "publ ic good" or the "proper good of
the whole" "relates the parts to itself alone and
sacrifices them to itself."(16)
But if the individual is only a part, the person,
on the other hand, is a whole, or an end in himself.
Mar i tain, therefore, arrives at the seemingly anamolous
pos i t ion t ha t "society is a whole composed of wholes. 1f
The If tension" between the human being as person and the
human being as individual, between the common good and
the public good, is only apparent, he believes. It is
resolved by a double or dialectical movement of "reci-
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