Freedom, Society, and State - Ludwig von Mises Institute

Utility
of
Party
B
A
Percent of Income
A = Expected Ut iii ty wi th 50% chance of 100% of the income
and 50% chance of 0% of the income (competit
ion) •
B = Expected Ut iIi ty wi th 100% chance of 50% of the income
(collusion).
Fig. 5: Party Utility Under Competition and Collusion
I n b r i e f, inc 0 n t r a s t tot h e Down s ia n modeli n
wh i c h par tie s are viewed ass a I e s -rna x imi z i ng fir ms ,
Wittman depicts them as profit-maximizing oligolopists:
Just as 01 igolopists often collude against
the consumers, the parties may collude
a g a ins t the v 0 t e r s • Insuc h casesthe dis ­
tinct ion between multiparty systems and one
party systems may not be very great.(53)
F or 0 u r pur po s esit i s not nee e s s a r y to prove
co II us ion, a I t hough several examples come immediately
to mind: the 1940 agreement between Roosevelt and
Wilk i e t 0 a v 0 i d the iss u e 0 f the wa r i n Eur 0 pe ; the
apparently tacit agreement between the parties to avoid
such issues as civil rights in the 1950's and the war
in Vietnam in the 1960's. Since Downs' model hinges on
the correlation between responsiveness and information,
we need only examine this relationship. Public opinion
studies consistently indicate an appalling lack of political
knowledge on the part of the average citizen.
On 1 y abo u t f i f t y per c e n t even know t hat ea c h s tat e has
two Senators; fewer still can name their Congressman or
know the length of his term, much less what party he
belongs to or how he voted.(54) Given this dearth of
in forma t ion, mos t voters would be much closer to W,W'
t han D, D'. T hat i s to say, i n for rna t ion Ieve 1s are too
low to insure much in the way of responsiveness.
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