Freedom, Society, and State - Ludwig von Mises Institute

says, may therefore forbid even nonmembers from engaging
in acts of self-defense against clients of the compan
y pro v ide d "t he c lien t s 0 f the prot e c t i ve agen c y • • •
compensate the independents for the disadvantages imposed
u p 0 nthem by be i ng proh i bit e d self - he 1penfor c e ­
ment of their own rights against the agency's clients."
Compensat ion would be in the form of "protective services
to cover those si tuations of conflict with the
paying customers of the protective agency."(78) Since
competition would ostensibly reduce the number of protective
agencies, and since the principle of compensat
ion permit s the d om inan t proteet i ve agenc y t 0 for bid
even nonclients (including their agencies) from defendi
n g thems e 1 v e s pro v ide d the y r e c e i v e compensa t ion,
N0 z i c k fee Ishe has pro v ide d a jus t i fica t i on for a
minimal state.
Nozick's criticism is two-fold: the practical consider'ation
that such a society would be most inconvenient,
and the moral proposition that such types of nonaggressive
act ivi ty as "self-help enforcement" can be
forcibly prohibited provided compensation is granted.
As noted above, the anarchists deny that their society
wou I d be i nconven i ent. On the contrary, they bel ieve
that since no one could legally initiate force for any
reason and s i nee er ime would not pay, there would be
considerably less need for punishment of any kind,
"private" or "public," and thus little need to fear it.
Further, since everyone would be held responsible for
the actions he performs, accidents, excessive use of
for c e, etc., W 0 u I d,. not r e c e i ve imm unit y because they
occurred in the "pursuit of justice." As the Tannehills
note, "In the process of collecting from the aggressor,
the victim (or his agents) may not carelessly or viciously
destroy values belonging to the aggressor or
take more from him than the original property (or an
equivalent value) plus costs occasioned by the aggress
ion • " ( 7 9 ) I fanyin d i v i d ua lor em p loye e 0 f a
defense agency did
negl i gently or aggressively apprehend individ
u a 1s, the imp r 0 per 1y de t a i ned i nd i v i d ua 1 rna y
c h a r get h e de fen sea g e n t employe e withaggression
or negligence. The mistakes by defense
agents will be covered by the insuring
bonding company. Under these conditions, a
d e fen sec 0 mpan y w i I I not ret a inan em p loye e
making an unreasonable number of mistakes,
because the cost of insuring such personnel
would soon become prohibitive for them. There
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