Space Security Index

Space Security 2011
146
Trend 7.3: E orts under way to develop capacity to rapidly
rebuild space systems following direct attacks, but
operational capabilities remain limited
e capability to rapidly rebuild space systems in the wake of a space negation attack could
reduce vulnerabilities in space. It is also assumed that space actors have the capability to
rebuild satellite ground stations. is trend examines the capabilities to ret space systems
by launching new satellites into orbit in a timely manner to replace satellites damaged or
destroyed by a potential attack. Although eorts are under way to enable rapid recovery, no
actor currently has this capability.
During the Cold War, the USSR and the U.S. led in the development of economical launch
vehicles capable of launching new satellites to repair space systems following an attack. e
USSR/Russia has launched less expensive, less sophisticated, and shorter-lived satellites than
those of the US, but has also launched them more often. Soviet-era pressure vessel spacecraft
designs, still in use today, have an advantage over Western vented satellite designs that require
a period of outgassing before the satellite can enter service. 66 In principle, Russia has the
capacity to deploy redundancy in its space systems at a lower cost and to allow quicker space
access to facilitate the reconstitution of its systems. For instance, in 2004, Russia conducted a
large military exercise that included plans for the rapid launch of military satellites to replace
space assets lost in action. 67 A signicant number of Russia’s current launches, however, are
of other nations’ satellites and Russia continues to struggle to maintain existing military
systems in operational condition. us little redundancy is actually leveraged through this
launch capability. 68
e U.S. has undertaken signicant eorts to develop responsive space capabilities. In 2007,
the DOD Operationally Responsive Space Oce opened to coordinate the development of
hardware and doctrine in support of ORS across the various agencies. 69 ORS has three main
objectives: 1) Rapid Design, Build, Test with a launch-ready spacecraft within 15 months
from authority to proceed; 2) Responsive Launch, Checkout, Operations to include launch
within one week of a call-up from a stored state; and 3) Militarily Signicant Capability
to include obtaining images with tactically signicant resolution provided directly to the
theater. New launch capabilities form the cornerstone of this program. Indeed the USAF
Space Command has noted: “An operationally responsive spacelift capability is critical to
place timely missions on orbit assuring our access to space.” 70 Initial steps included a Small
Launch Vehicle subprogram for a rocket capable of placing 100 to 1,000 kg into LEO on
24-hours notice; however, such a program may ultimately be linked to a long-term prompt
global strike capability. 71 Under this program AirLaunch LLC was asked to develop the
QuickReach air-launch rocket and SpaceX to develop the Falcon-1 reusable launch vehicle
to fulll the SLV requirements. 72 In September 2008, Falcon-1 reached orbit on its fourth
attempt. 73
e USAF TacSat microsatellite series is also intended for ORS demonstration, combining
existing military and commercial technologies such as imaging and communications with
new commercial launch systems to provide “more rapid and less expensive access to space.” 74
A full ORS capability could allow the U.S. to replace satellites on short notice, 75 enabling
rapid recover from space negation attacks and reducing general space system vulnerabilities.
e concept for a U.S. Space Maneuver Vehicle or military space plane rst emerged in the
1990s as a small, powered, reusable space vehicle operating as an upper stage of a reusable
launch vehicle. 76 e rst technology demonstrators built were the X-40 (USAF) and the