Space Security Index

Space Security 2011
152
revealed that, whilst the equipment could be used for satellite jamming, this would be
technically dicult.” 33
North Korea demonstrated a more sophisticated capability when it intermittently jammed
GPS signals over the course of three days in August. Commenting on a potentially dangerous
problem in an already volatile region, U.S. military ocials said they were not surprised by
this example of the North Korean “culture of military creativity.” 34
Space Security Impact
e technologies used to hack into computer networks and jam satellite communications
links are widely available; the relative ease with which such attacks are carried out has a
negative impact on space security. Paradoxically, more incidents of jamming and the
proliferation of jamming capabilities may also have a positive eect on space security, as
they seem to be creating some impetus for more assertive action from the ITU. e proven
ability of even minor powers to jam satellite transmissions, including ones used by the U.S.
military, should generate increased interest in protecting communications from interference.
Trend 8.2: Ongoing proliferation of ground-based capabilities
to attack satellites
A series of U.S. and Soviet/Russian programs during the Cold War and into the 1990s
sought to develop ground-based weapons that employed conventional, nuclear, or directed
energy capabilities against satellites. As well, recent incidents involving the use of ASATs
underscore the detrimental eect they have for space security, in particular should these
weapons be used for hostile purposes against an adversary.
Conventional (kinetic intercept) weapons
Launching a payload to coincide with the passage of a satellite in orbit is the fundamental
requirement for a conventional anti-satellite capability. To date, nine nations have conrmed
autonomous orbital launch capabilities, as discussed in chapter 4. Tracking capabilities
would allow a payload of metal pellets or gravel to be launched into the path of a satellite by
rockets or missiles (such as a SCUD missile). 35 Kinetic hit-to-kill technology requires more
advanced sensors to reach the target. Targeting satellites from the ground using any of these
methods would likely be more cost-eective and reliable than space-based options. 36
USAF Counterspace Operations Document 2-2.1 outlines a set of “counterspace operations”
designed to “preclude an adversary from exploiting space to their advantage…using a
variety of permanent and/or reversible means.” 37 Among the tools for oensive counterspace
operations, the document lists direct ascent and co-orbital ASATs, directed energy weapons,
and electronic warfare weapons. e U.S. Army invested in ground-based kinetic energy
ASAT technology in the late 1980s and early 1990s. e small, longstanding Kinetic
Energy ASAT program was terminated in 1993 but was later granted funding by Congress
from FY1996 through FY2005. 38 For FY2005 Congress appropriated $14-million for the
KE-ASAT program through the MDA Ballistic Missile Defense Products budget. 39 e
KE-ASAT program was part of the Army Counterspace Technology testbed at Redstone
Arsenal. 40 e U.S. has also deployed a limited number of ground-based exoatmospheric
kill vehicle (EKV) interceptors, including the Aegis (Sea-Based Midcourse) and Ground-
Based Midcourse Defense Systems, for ballistic missile defense purposes. 41 EKVs use infrared
sensors to detect ballistic missiles in midcourse and maneuver into the trajectory of the
missile to ensure a hit to kill. 42 With limited modication, the EKV could be used against