Space Security Index

Space Security 2011
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control for U.S. forces. 122 e 2004 Air Force document Counterspace Operations explicitly
mentioned military operations “to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy adversary space
capabilities.” 123 e authoritative DOD Joint Publication 3-14 on Space Operations states
that “space systems have increased the importance of space power to joint force commanders
(JFCs) and U.S. national interests” 124 and adds: “Military, civil, and commercial sectors
of the U.S. are increasingly dependent on space capabilities, and this dependence can be
viewed by adversaries as a potential vulnerability.” 125 Furthermore, the importance of space
applications for military operations is highlighted and space force application operations
are dened as “combat operations in, through, and from space to inuence the course and
outcome of conict by holding terrestrial targets at risk.” 126
Russia has repeatedly expressed concern that attacks on its early warning and space surveillance
systems would represent a direct threat to its security. 127 Hence, a basic Russian national
security objective is the protection of Russian space systems, including ground stations on
its territory. 128 ese concerns are rooted in Russia’s assessment that modern warfare is
becoming increasingly dependent on space-based force enhancement capabilities. 129
In practical terms, Russian military space policy in the last decade appears to have had
two main priorities. e rst was transitioning to a new generation of space equipment
capabilities, including cheaper and more ecient information technology systems. 130 e
second was upgrading its nuclear missile attack warning system. Russia has expressed concern
about the potential weaponization of space and the extension of the arms race to outer
space, especially in light of the development of U.S. missile defense systems. 131 Russia has
actively argued for a treaty prohibiting the deployment of weapons in space and, as discussed
elsewhere in this chapter, it jointly introduced the PPWT with China to the CD in 2008.
As well, its National Security Strategy, signed by President Medvedev in 2009, cites the
potential dangers posed by the increased militarization of space activities.
China’s military space doctrine is not made public. e country’s 2006 White Paper on
Space Activities identies national security as a principle of China’s space program. 132 e
2004 National Defense White Paper describes China’s plans to develop technologies as part
of the modernization of its armed forces, including “dual purpose technology” in space, for
civil and military use. 133 A subsequent White Paper in 2006 describes “informationization”
as a key strategy of its military modernization — although there is no express mention of
the use of outer space for national defense — and asserts an international security strategy
based on developing cooperative, non-confrontational, and nonaligned military relations
with other states. 134 Nonetheless, in contemporary Chinese military science, the military use
of space is inextricably linked to attaining comprehensive national military power. 135 China
demonstrated signicant space negation capabilities in the destruction of one of its orbiting
satellites with a missile in 2007, but maintains that the test was “not targeted at any country
and will not threaten any country,” remaining publicly committed to the non-weaponization
of space. 136 A 2009 statement by a high-ranking ocial of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) about the inevitability of an arms race in outer space 137 proved highly controversial.
e space policies of EU member states recognize that eorts to assume a larger role in
international aairs will require the development of space assets such as global communications,
positioning, and observation systems; 138 this understanding is reected in the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). e paper “European Space Policy: ESDP and Space”
adopted by the European Council in 2004 was the rst council strategy paper on the use of
space for ESDP purposes, and was followed by a roadmap for implementation in 2005. 139
While most European space capabilities have focused on civil applications, there is an
increasing awareness of the need to strengthen dual-use and dedicated military capabilities. 140