Space Security Index

Space Security 2011
150
also underscored the challenges generated by space negation eorts focused on “blinding” the
strategic communications and attack warning capabilities of an adversary. 5
Security concerns arising from the development of negation capabilities are compounded
by the fact that many key space capabilities are inherently dual-use. For example, space
launchers are required for many anti-satellite systems; microsatellites oer great advantages
as space-based kinetic-intercept vehicles; and space surveillance capabilities can support both
space debris collision avoidance strategies and targeting for weapons. e application of
some destructive space negation capabilities, such as kinetic-intercept vehicles, would also
generate space debris that could potentially inict widespread damage on other space systems
and undermine the sustainability of outer space, as discussed in chapter 1. In addition, a
HAND is indiscriminate in its eects and would generate long-term negative impacts on
space security.
Trend 8.1: Increasing capabilities to attack space
communications links
The most vulnerable components of space systems are the ground stations and
communications links, which are susceptible to attack from commonly accessible weapons
and technologies. An attack on the ground segments of space systems with conventional
military force is one of the most likely space negation scenarios. Only modest military means
would be required for system sabotage; physical attack on the ground facility by armed
invaders, vehicles, or missiles; and interference with power sources.
e U.S. leads in developing advanced technologies to temporarily negate space systems by
disrupting or denying access to satellite communications. In 2004, the mobile, ground-based
CounterCom system, designed to provide temporary and reversible disruption of a targeted
satellite’s communications signals, was declared operational. 6 In 2007, this system was
upgraded to fully equip two squadrons with seven jamming systems, up from the original
two. 7 Next-generation jammers will likely have “enhanced capabilities for SATCOM
denial,” using largely commercially available components. 8 Moreover, the recently released
U.S. National Security Space Strategy states that the U.S. will retain the “capabilities to
respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail.” 9
e U.S. Space Control Technology program sought to “continue development and
demonstration of advanced counter-communications technologies and techniques…leading
to future generation counter-communications systems and advanced target characteristics.” 10
e mission description for this program noted that, “consistent with DOD policy, the
negation eorts of this program focus only on negation technologies which have temporary,
localized, and reversible eects.” 11 e 2004 Presidential Directive on Space-Based Positioning,
Navigation and Timing Systems called for development of capabilities to selectively deny, as
necessary, GPS and other navigation services. 12
Although the U.S. has the most advanced space capabilities, the technical means for
electronic and information warfare, including hacking into computer networks and
electronic jamming of satellite communications links, are widely available. For instance,
the jamming by Libyan nationals of the uraya Satellite Telecommunications mobile
satellite, in an eort to disrupt the activities of smugglers of contraband into Libya, lasted
more than six months. 13 Similarly, reports emerged in November 2007 that China had
deployed advanced GPS jamming systems on vans throughout the country. 14 Incidents of
jamming the relatively weak signals of GPS are not new. Iraq’s acquisition of GPS-jamming