Industrial Relations in Europe 2012 - European Commission - Europa
Industrial Relations in Europe 2012 - European Commission - Europa
Industrial Relations in Europe 2012 - European Commission - Europa
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can also br<strong>in</strong>g specific benefits <strong>in</strong> terms of a better capacity to protect <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong>terests through<br />
the pressure union representatives can exert on a politically sensitive employer.<br />
Second, union representation tends to be more segmented than <strong>in</strong> the private sector. This reflects,<br />
on the one hand, the significant presence <strong>in</strong> the public sector of relatively strong professional<br />
groups and identities, such as those <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the medical professions, teachers and professors,<br />
and higher functionaries. On the other hand, the absence of market constra<strong>in</strong>ts, the political<br />
sensitivity of employment issues, and the relevant barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g power that certa<strong>in</strong> groups of public<br />
employees hold, such as those of a particular contract type, can encourage the creation of a plurality<br />
of professional trade unions, which <strong>in</strong> some cases may pursue particularistic objectives, that is the<br />
improvement of the conditions of their specific constituency without consider<strong>in</strong>g the impacts of<br />
their demands on other groups of workers or on the public at large.<br />
Third, on the employer side, with particular reference to the barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g table, there are political<br />
entities and representatives (such as m<strong>in</strong>istries and m<strong>in</strong>isters) or <strong>in</strong>dependent agencies. Aga<strong>in</strong>, the<br />
absence of market constra<strong>in</strong>ts makes political decisions crucial, for <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>in</strong> terms of the<br />
economic resources available for wage barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. However, there can be important differences<br />
depend<strong>in</strong>g on whether the responsibility of negotiations and consultation with trade unions lies with<br />
direct political representatives or adm<strong>in</strong>istrative officers and managers (the ‘employers’ <strong>in</strong> practice)<br />
or <strong>in</strong>dependent agencies. This latter solution <strong>in</strong>creases the distance between the political sphere and<br />
the regulation of public employment relations – and it is therefore often proposed <strong>in</strong> order to<br />
emulate private sector conditions; however, this has some potential drawbacks l<strong>in</strong>ked to the loss of<br />
direct knowledge of organisational features and day-to-day work issues and practices.<br />
Trade union density<br />
The issue of trade union density <strong>in</strong> the public sector was <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> chapter 1 of this report.<br />
Table 3.8 shows trade union density <strong>in</strong> the public and private sectors at the end of 2000s and, where<br />
available, variations s<strong>in</strong>ce the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the decade. As the data illustrate, trade union density <strong>in</strong><br />
the public sector is systematically higher than <strong>in</strong> the private sector. The difference can be very wide,<br />
as <strong>in</strong> the UK (57% vs. 15%), Greece (64% vs. 19%), and Ireland (67% vs. 21%). The difference is<br />
particularly significant <strong>in</strong> some of the Nordic countries: <strong>in</strong> Norway it is more than 40 percentage<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ts (80% compared with 38%) and <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land it is above 30 percentage po<strong>in</strong>ts (82% compared<br />
with 50%).<br />
Further, the trend <strong>in</strong> the most recent decade seems to <strong>in</strong>dicate a stronger capacity of public sector<br />
unions to contrast the erosion of density. However, <strong>in</strong> this case there are several exceptions and the<br />
difference is not always wide. The stronger position of the public sector is clearly evident <strong>in</strong><br />
Denmark, F<strong>in</strong>land (where private sector unionisation fell by nearly 20 percentage po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the<br />
2000s) and Norway (two percentage po<strong>in</strong>ts less <strong>in</strong> the public sector and five <strong>in</strong> the private sector).<br />
Ireland even shows a positive trend <strong>in</strong> the public sector (+11 percentage po<strong>in</strong>ts) and a negative trend<br />
<strong>in</strong> the private sector (-10 percentage po<strong>in</strong>ts). But <strong>in</strong> the other cases there is no substantial difference<br />
(Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and UK). France shows a decrease of public sector union<br />
density which compares to stability <strong>in</strong> the private sector. However, this takes place <strong>in</strong> the context of<br />
a very low density rate <strong>in</strong> the private sector (4.5%), so that it may be considered a sort of m<strong>in</strong>imum<br />
level, with limited scope for further decrease. The importance of the public sector for trade unions is<br />
also apparent when look<strong>in</strong>g at the share of members <strong>in</strong> total national union membership. It is<br />
usually above one third of all union members, with a peak of 61% <strong>in</strong> the UK and other countries<br />
where it exceeds 50% (Greece, France, Ireland, Netherlands and Norway).<br />
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