Industrial Relations in Europe 2012 - European Commission - Europa

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less eager to join an employers’ association, or these associations do not exist in particular sectors. Lowest employer density rates can be found in Estonia, Lithuania and Poland – countries where the low degree of employer organising is among the crucial factors of extensive bargaining decentralisation. Chart 2.12: Employer organisation density rates in the EU, 2008 Source: ICTWSS database version 3.0 (2011) Note: FI: data 2006; CZ, LT and RO: 2007; BE and SI: 2009 2.2.2 Collective bargaining at the sectoral or higher level of coordination The entrenchment of collective bargaining at the sectoral or higher levels of coordination is the second pillar of that allows a comparison between the CEECs and the EU-15. Table 2.4 presents the extent of bargaining coordination across EU member states. With the exception of Slovenia, coordination of wage bargaining in the CEECs is in general more fragmented and decentralised than in EU-15 countries. Sector or industry-level bargaining only applies to Romania and Slovakia; however, even in these countries such bargaining coordination does not account for a regular pattern setting and is based on a weak involvement of central social partner organisations. Government involvement in wage bargaining does not yield a clear difference between the CEECs and the EU-15, because in most EU member states the government does not directly participate in (tripartite) wage bargaining. Legally stipulated extension mechanisms supplement institutionalised bargaining procedures in most EU Member States (for an overview of extension, see section 2.3.4 on extension of collective agreements). The aim of extensions is to broaden the coverage of collective agreements and thus foster solidarity wage setting also among employees in companies outside employers’ associations. Table 2.5 documents the fact that extension mechanisms are not widely institutionalised and used in the CEECs. Legal provision for mandatory extension of collective agreement coverage affecting more than 10% of the workforce is available only in Hungary; however, at the same time, Hungary suffers from a generally weak enforceability of collective agreements (see Table 2.4). In other CEECs, legal extension mechanisms are 79
Level Government intervention in wage bargaining Table 2.4 Degree of coordination and government intervention, 2000 – 2010* Coordination of wage bargaining Coordination of and government intervention in wage bargaining 4: The government participates directly in wage bargaining (tripartite bargaining, as in social pacts) 3: The government influences wage bargaining outcomes indirectly through price- ceilings, indexation, tax measures, minimum wages, and/or pattern setting through public sector wages 2: The government influences wage bargaining by providing an institutional framework of consultation and information exchange 1: fragmented bargaining, mostly at company level PL, LT, MT EE, LV, UK * Average for 2000-2010; CEECs in italics. Source: ICTWSS database version 3.0 (2011). 2: mixed or alternating industry- and firm level bargaining, with weak enforceability of industry agreements BG, CZ, HU, LU,FR 3: industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting, limited involvement of central organisations, and limited freedoms for company bargaining RO, SK, PT 4: mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining: a) central organisations negotiate nonenforceable central agreements (guidelines) and/or b) key unions and employers associations set pattern for the entire economy SI, FI,BE, IE EL, ES, NL CY DK, SE DE, IT, AT either not available or not widely used due to various obstacles. For example, in Slovakia, extension is possible only upon consent of the employer concerned, which represents an additional institutional barrier to broadening the coverage of collective agreements (see Box 2.2). Table 2.5 Collective bargaining levels and extension mechanisms, 2000 – 2010* Extension mechanisms Dominant level of collective bargaining and the presence of extension mechanisms (average of years 2000-2010, CEECs in red) 0:legal provision for mandatory extension not available 1: legal provision for mandatory extension available, but not regularly or widely used (=10%) 4: national or central level, with SI, IE BE, EL, FI additional sectoral / local or company bargaining 3: sectoral or industry level RO,DK, IT, NL, PT, SE DE AT, ES 2: sectoral or industry level, with additional local or company bargaining CY,LU 1: local or company bargaining LT,LV,PL,MT,UK EE * Average for 2000-2010; CEECs in italics. Source: ICTWSS database version 3.0 (2011). BG,CZ, SK HU, FR 80
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Industrial Relations in Europe 2012
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Neither the European Commission nor
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Table of contents Executive summary
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employers. The second covers countr
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as has trade union fragmentation, d
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collective bargaining, in other cou
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fragmentation and pay dispersion ha
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Generating new jobs and transformin
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een negligible. Second- and third-t
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Nevertheless, the study indicated m
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Chapter 1: Overview of European, na
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2010, collective bargaining coverag
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short period of eight years. In Est
Page 30 and 31: Chart 1.6: Bargaining centralisatio
Page 32 and 33: A core aim of the CAWIE project has
Page 34 and 35: purposes of the present analysis. T
Page 36 and 37: have been substituted by contractin
Page 38 and 39: Table 1.1 shows that in 11 countrie
Page 40 and 41: SI SK UK Central level agreements.
Page 42 and 43: IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK
Page 44 and 45: Across the EU the magnitude of the
Page 46 and 47: IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SE Jo
Page 48 and 49: argaining in the same way so that d
Page 50 and 51: Table 1.6: Major unions in the publ
Page 52 and 53: LU LV MT NL General Confederation o
Page 54 and 55: As shown by Visser (2010) for the n
Page 56 and 57: 1.5 Employers’ associations In co
Page 58 and 59: SI SK Governmental bargaining group
Page 60 and 61: State-centred, including Greece, Sp
Page 62 and 63: Chart 1.12: Comparison between nati
Page 64 and 65: this would imply that industrial re
Page 66 and 67: Doellgast, V. and Greer, I. (2007),
Page 68 and 69: Chapter 2: Industrial relations dev
Page 70 and 71: the only available source of compar
Page 72 and 73: Chart 2.4: Annual net earnings in t
Page 74 and 75: Table 2.1 GINI coefficients for the
Page 76 and 77: producers’ Finally, the governmen
Page 78 and 79: A weakening membership base indicat
Page 82 and 83: The lower degree of bargaining coor
Page 84 and 85: Existence of tripartite council con
Page 86 and 87: including trade unions in policymak
Page 88 and 89: Legal extension of collective agree
Page 90 and 91: Descriptive statistical evidence (s
Page 92 and 93: of sector-level collective agreemen
Page 94 and 95: * Italics indicate pacts addressing
Page 96 and 97: the liberal CEECs (LT, LV, EE, RO a
Page 98 and 99: 2.3.7 Interim conclusions Unionisat
Page 100 and 101: Chart 2.16: Multi-national companie
Page 102 and 103: Box 2.3 Coping with the economic cr
Page 104 and 105: motivation for employers was findin
Page 106 and 107: EE HU rapid increase before the cri
Page 108 and 109: SK 2011: cuts/freeze planned SI 200
Page 110 and 111: cooperation within the EU, where be
Page 112 and 113: cabinet resignation, Romania renege
Page 114 and 115: important for building additional r
Page 116 and 117: References Avdagic, S. (2005), ‘S
Page 118: egulationin Eastern Europe’, in D
Page 121 and 122: and not an exact measurement of the
Page 123 and 124: Of the remaining countries, four -
Page 125 and 126: In some cases this is linked to emp
Page 127 and 128: and social security activities have
Page 129 and 130: Table 3.4 Part-time employment, 201
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Table 3.6 Number employed in tempor
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3.4 Employment status and the right
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employees (Angestellte and Arbeiter
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Table 3.8 Trade union density in th
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distinguish between ‘technical’
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with adequate services as well as t
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Wales) about pay increases, based o
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majority public ownership) than in
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3.7 Centralisation, decentralisatio
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government over the entire bargaini
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3.8 Industrial conflict and settlem
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all of public employees. Career civ
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is also paid to equal pay and low-p
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Casale G. (2008), Public service la
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Pedersini R. (2009), “La riforma
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Appendix 3.1 Number employed in pub
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Chapter 4: The consequences of the
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had a lengthy engagement with NPM r
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Moreover, after an initial increase
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GDP), Denmark (3.2%), Cyprus (0.9%)
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in 2009 - a target that was missed
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public sector and its workforce in
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Pay Cut Pay Freeze Other measures H
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Nevertheless, it should be remember
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able to progress to higher salary p
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the sharing of information technolo
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and moves towards fiscal consolidat
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the importance of inward investment
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In countries less affected by auste
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Spain -18,000 in 2010 in public adm
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4.5.2 Responses of social partners
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Country Protest & Strikes Finland F
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Country Protest & Strikes Spain Ext
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It has been suggested that although
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Acknowledgements We thank Berndt Ke
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Ibsen, C., Larsen, T., Madsen, J. a
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Chapter 5: Greening the social dial
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(Ueapme 2010 55 ). Fostering the ad
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5.3 Cooperative approaches in manag
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Chemical industry institutes) is th
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5.4 Representation within an emergi
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In other countries, the emergence o
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Skills developments Career and empl
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(WiRES 83 ) looked into the aspect
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Career and employment security Heal
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solar energy production, has launch
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will hire unemployed workers, with
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Overall, industrial relations in gr
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References Arbeiterkammer Wien, Ins
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Chapter 6: Social partner involveme
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the same country in different areas
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6.3 Unemployment benefit systems Th
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established tripartite cooperation.
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would appear that the funds were a
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Further, according to the most rece
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An example of social concertation i
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government will facilitate the acco
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funds. The schemes were based on pe
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of industrial actions in the summer
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managing these insurance funds is t
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6.6.2 Social partner influence on p
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etirement income gap by private fun
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Acknowledgements The author would l
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Natali D (2009), Public/private mix
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Commission must consult the social
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social partners' increasing role as
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The agreement is a significant achi
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the Commission not to present it to
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In late July 2012 the cross-industr
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Through the AGS the Commission has
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workplaces in local and regional go
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Moreover, the social partners are c
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Change Summit in Cancun in December
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linked to the Europe 2020 strategy
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EU's flagship policy towards the se
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to be included in the national LLL
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industry and sectoral social dialog
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In the construction sector, the Eur
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In the sugar sector, the implementa
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Directive on 30 May 2012. In this,
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well represented at the higher leve
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to establish and/or improve nationa
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Federation of Textiles, Clothing an
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Chart 7.1 Number and type of texts
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commitment to the aim of full imple
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Table 7.1: European sectoral social
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Table 7.2: European social partner
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Recovering and strengthening compet
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Joint position regarding the Europe
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developments, explains the Commissi
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The review is based on consultation
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concluded on 21 May 2012 a European
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Furthermore, studies were commissio
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Report of 26 October 2012 on the im
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Six judgments were delivered relati
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In Case C-3/10 162 , the ECJ ruled
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In Case C 282/10 179 , the ECJ deci
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8.3 Health and safety of workers 8.
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8.3.5 Exposure to asbestos Practica
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of data due to the need for major a
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and effects of the EU Directives on
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2. FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS DIRECTI
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HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS Free
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