Industrial Relations in Europe 2012 - European Commission - Europa

would appear that the funds were a battleground on which the government sought to influence wage
policy. Kjellberg (2009) notes that increases in the fees of union unemployment funds, aimed at
pressuring unions to moderate their wage claims, resulted in significant losses in the membership of
trade unions and of the funds: “In 2007, union unemployment funds lost almost twice as many
members as the unions did. In a period of one year, union density declined by 4 percentage points,
which is unique in modern Swedish history and remarkable also from an international perspective
… by changing the Swedish Ghent system the government caused a fall in union density with no
parallel in modern Swedish history.”
6.4 Main trends in social partner involvement in unemployment benefit
The context within which unemployment benefit systems operate has changed radically since many
of these systems were first created. Clasen and Clegg (2011) note that many of these benefit
systems were designed in economies that were predominantly industrial and characterised by
employment relationships that were largely standardised and followed a stable career path. Over the
past 20 years or so, this scenario has changed significantly, as the result of a move towards
predominantly service-based economies and demand for more flexibility in terms of wages and
employment terms and conditions. These types of changes in circumstance and context have had an
influence on the level and influence of the social partners, although it would seem that the degree of
change depends to a large extent on the national context.
Schaapman and van het Kaar (2007) note that social partner influence is likely to be stable and
undisputed in countries with a strong and continuing tradition of social partnership (such as Finland
and Sweden), where there is a strong tradition of state leadership in social security (such as in
Hungary), or where there is little social partner influence in the area of social security, and no
debate on changing the situation (eg in the UK). In countries such as Slovenia and Malta, although
influence is stable, the social partners are demanding more influence in the area of social benefits.
Institutional changes are deemed to have had a negative impact on the influence of the social
partners on unemployment benefit systems in some countries, such as Denmark and Germany.
Further, lack of consensus among the social partners themselves in some countries, such as France,
was also identified to have a negative impact on social partner influence in the area of social
benefits.
Some trends can also have positive influences on social partner involvement and influence. These
include institutional changes to the advantage of the social partners, and proactive social partner
approaches. This has been the case in Ireland where, although the welfare system is not generous,
social partner influence has increased since 1987 due to the growth of social partnership (although
this has now come under severe pressure as a result of the financial crisis). On occasion, trade union
action has resulted in policy influence – this has been the case in recent years in countries such as
Austria, the Netherlands and Spain.
Most recently, the pressures affecting the operation of unemployment benefit systems are likely to
have been exacerbated by the crisis, as governments implement austerity measures and cost-cutting
plans (see also chapter 4 of this report). Social partners are being involved to a greater or lesser
extent in this process – for more details, see the section below on the effects of the crisis.
Another issue relevant to the formulation of unemployment benefit policy and the social partners’
involvement in this is that of the reservation wage – the lowest level of income that would be
237