01.02.2015 Views

69249454-chandler-semiotics

69249454-chandler-semiotics

69249454-chandler-semiotics

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

MODELS OF THE SIGN 55<br />

1<br />

2<br />

3<br />

4<br />

5<br />

6<br />

7<br />

8222<br />

9<br />

10<br />

1<br />

2<br />

3<br />

4<br />

5<br />

6<br />

7<br />

8<br />

9<br />

20<br />

1222<br />

2<br />

3<br />

4<br />

5<br />

6<br />

7<br />

8<br />

9<br />

30<br />

1<br />

2<br />

3<br />

4<br />

5<br />

6<br />

7222<br />

edition of the Course) and this perspective became widely accepted<br />

from around the 1970s. More recently, studies have shown that<br />

material objects can themselves function directly as signs (more<br />

strictly, of course, as signifiers), not only in the form of ‘status<br />

symbols’ (such as expensive cars) but also (in the case of particular<br />

objects in their homes which individuals regard as having some<br />

special importance for them) as part of the repertoire of signs upon<br />

which people draw in developing and maintaining their sense of<br />

personal and social identity (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton<br />

1981, Chalfen 1987). People attach ‘symbolic values’ to television<br />

sets, furniture and photograph albums which are not determined by<br />

the utilitarian functions of such mundane objects (see also Leeds-<br />

Hurwitz 1993, Chapter 6). The groundwork for such thinking had<br />

already been laid within structuralism. Lévi-Strauss had explored<br />

‘the logic of the concrete’ – observing, for instance, that animals are<br />

‘good to think [with]’ and that identity can be expressed through the<br />

manipulation of existing things (Lévi-Strauss 1962). Elsewhere, I<br />

have explored the notion that personal homepages on the web function<br />

as manipulable objects with which their authors can think about<br />

identity (Chandler 2006).<br />

Jay David Bolter argues that ‘signs are always anchored in a<br />

medium. Signs may be more or less dependent upon the characteristics<br />

of one medium – they may transfer more or less well to other<br />

media – but there is no such thing as a sign without a medium’ (Bolter<br />

1991, 195–6). The sign as such may not be a material entity, but it<br />

has a material dimension – the signifier (or sign vehicle). Robert<br />

Hodge and David Tripp insist that, ‘fundamental to all semiotic analysis<br />

is the fact that any system of signs (semiotic code) is carried<br />

by a material medium which has its own principles of structure’<br />

(Hodge and Tripp 1986, 17). Furthermore, some media draw on<br />

several interacting sign-systems: television and film, for example,<br />

utilize verbal, visual, auditory and locomotive signs. The medium is<br />

not ‘neutral’; each medium has its own affordances and constraints<br />

and, as Umberto Eco notes, each is already ‘charged with cultural<br />

signification’ (Eco 1976, 267). For instance, photographic and audiovisual<br />

media are almost invariably regarded as more real than other

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!