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Summary Report for Conduct of Kozloduy NPP Stress Tests

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“<strong>Kozloduy</strong> <strong>NPP</strong>” PLC<br />

SUMMARY REPORT<br />

<strong>for</strong> <strong>Conduct</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Kozloduy</strong> <strong>NPP</strong><br />

<strong>Stress</strong> <strong>Tests</strong><br />

6.1.3.5 Factors which can prevent management <strong>of</strong> accident at the DSFS<br />

6.1.3.5.1 Impact on accessibility and habitability <strong>of</strong> DSFS, measures to prevent or control the<br />

situation<br />

At studies per<strong>for</strong>med within the analysis <strong>of</strong> the earthquake it is defined that <strong>for</strong> the container<br />

blocked with debris which might result from extreme <strong>of</strong>f-site initiating events, such as the<br />

earthquake, maximum temperature <strong>of</strong> the container will increase.<br />

For 100% blocking with debris results <strong>of</strong> calculations at conservative assumptions show that<br />

maximum temperature <strong>of</strong> the shell may be exceeded correspondingly only after more than 2 days.<br />

Considering the structure <strong>of</strong> the ro<strong>of</strong> cover, it is required to expect realistic level <strong>of</strong> заравяне<br />

surely below 50%. This will increase available time <strong>for</strong> counter measures to more than 7 days. Even<br />

<strong>for</strong> this the worst case <strong>of</strong> accident scenario with loss <strong>of</strong> heat removal there is sufficient time<br />

available <strong>for</strong> taking adequate countermeasures, i.e. to remove debris and to restore the natural<br />

ventilation.<br />

6.1.3.5.2 Feasibility and efficiency <strong>of</strong> measures <strong>for</strong> accident management in conditions <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fsite<br />

hazards (earthquake, flooding)<br />

DSFS will per<strong>for</strong>m its functions <strong>of</strong> safe storage <strong>of</strong> the spent fuel at seismic acceleration <strong>of</strong><br />

about 0.31 g. Prolongation <strong>of</strong> time <strong>for</strong> safe storage <strong>of</strong> fuel in this situation depends upon the<br />

possibility <strong>of</strong> removal <strong>of</strong> construction debris and upon restoration, if it is possible <strong>of</strong> the natural<br />

ventilation. This is seen from the analysis per<strong>for</strong>med <strong>for</strong> the earthquake.<br />

6.1.3.5.3 Unavailability <strong>of</strong> the power supply<br />

Scenario <strong>of</strong> complete loss <strong>of</strong> power supply is not relevant to safety <strong>of</strong> DSFS. Due to<br />

availability <strong>of</strong> the passive system to remove heat <strong>of</strong> the radioactive decay, safety operational mode<br />

<strong>of</strong> the storage structure is not dependent upon power supply. This is seen from the analysis<br />

per<strong>for</strong>med <strong>for</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> power supply and loss <strong>of</strong> ultimate heat sink.<br />

6.1.3.5.4 Potential failure <strong>of</strong> measurement instrumentation<br />

Failure to stationery systems <strong>for</strong> monitoring <strong>of</strong> radiation background and temperatures in<br />

container storage hall, is possible to be replenished <strong>for</strong> with portable measurement means.<br />

6.1.3.5.5 Potential impacts from other neighbouring installations at the site<br />

In case <strong>of</strong> accident <strong>of</strong> Units 3 and 4, Units 5 and 6 and wet SFS, the personnel <strong>of</strong> SFS acts in<br />

accordance with <strong>NPP</strong> Emergency Response Plan.<br />

6.1.4 Measures which may be envisioned to improve capabilities <strong>for</strong> accident management<br />

6.1.4.1 Measures <strong>for</strong> Units 3 and 4<br />

Measures to enhance robustness <strong>of</strong> Units 3 and 4s <strong>of</strong> <strong>Kozloduy</strong> <strong>NPP</strong> resulted from the<br />

analysis <strong>of</strong> combination <strong>of</strong> beyond design basis earthquake and flooding:<br />

185/202

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