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Summary Report for Conduct of Kozloduy NPP Stress Tests

Summary Report for Conduct of Kozloduy NPP Stress Tests

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“<strong>Kozloduy</strong> <strong>NPP</strong>” PLC<br />

SUMMARY REPORT<br />

<strong>for</strong> <strong>Conduct</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Kozloduy</strong> <strong>NPP</strong><br />

<strong>Stress</strong> <strong>Tests</strong><br />

· passive measures – the main civil structures are built <strong>of</strong> rein<strong>for</strong>ced concrete, the ro<strong>of</strong><br />

is filled with 6m fire strips (zones) <strong>of</strong> non-combustible materials.<br />

· active measures – they include external (ground <strong>for</strong> the plant) fire ring, internal fire<br />

fighting installation with fire taps in the rooms and dry tube <strong>for</strong> water extinguishing <strong>of</strong><br />

cover.<br />

occurrence.<br />

Fulfilment <strong>of</strong> the requirements <strong>of</strong> fire safety ensure the safety <strong>of</strong> SFS in case <strong>of</strong> fire<br />

The following possible explosions are discussed:<br />

· explosion <strong>of</strong> the receiver site <strong>of</strong> <strong>Kozloduy</strong> <strong>NPP</strong> – 1 and 2;<br />

· explosion <strong>of</strong> the receiver site <strong>of</strong> <strong>Kozloduy</strong> <strong>NPP</strong> – 3.<br />

Thus, the possible events defined do not jeopardize safety <strong>of</strong> SFS operation.<br />

2.7 MEASURES FOR PROTECTION OF DSFS SEISMIC DESIGN BASES<br />

2.7.1 Systems, structures and components (SSCs) required <strong>for</strong> DSFS maintaining in safe<br />

state<br />

The analyses are per<strong>for</strong>med based on the NRA approved technical design <strong>for</strong> construction <strong>of</strong><br />

DSFS [38]. As input the latest Interim safety analysis report [39] was used.<br />

Regardless <strong>of</strong> the fact that the quantity <strong>of</strong> radioactive material in the DSFS is large at the<br />

end <strong>of</strong> storage period, in the containers safe leak-tight confinement <strong>of</strong> this material is always<br />

ensured in pursuance <strong>of</strong> defence-in-depth principle. The radioactive decay heat is removed in a<br />

passive way.<br />

All safety functions during the storage are maintained in a passive way as there is no need in<br />

active safety systems.<br />

All SSCs <strong>of</strong> DSFS are classified considering their safety functions in accordance with the<br />

referent documents.<br />

The main SSCs required maintaining operability during and after earthquake are:<br />

· building;<br />

· crane 145 t;<br />

· containers;<br />

The analyzed accident scenarios during and after earthquake are as follows:<br />

· mechanical impact from earthquake;<br />

· container blocked with debris;<br />

· fire impact;<br />

· station blackout.<br />

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