Summary Report for Conduct of Kozloduy NPP Stress Tests

“Kozloduy NPP” PLC
SUMMARY REPORT
for Conduct of Kozloduy NPP
Stress Tests
2.7.1.2 Seismic design basis for crane 145 t in DSFS building
Similarly to the building, the crane was also evaluated for the following adverse
combinations of load conditions:
· OBE (SL1 from 0,1 g) with operating crane 145 t
· DBE (SL2 from 0,2 g) with standby crane 145 t.
Both the building and the crane are designed for OBE and DBE without destruction of the
structures or load falling.
2.7.1.3 Seismic design basis for other process equipment
Clamping devices (hook and sleepers) and contact devices are evaluated only for design
basis earthquake (SL1 from 0,1 g) with the operating crane in the storage area, including load from
own weight, fixed loads and impulse loads.
The protective door is estimated for DBE (SL1 from 0,1 g) at any position of the door, and
for DBE (SL2 from 0,2 g) at the closed position of the door.
2.7.1.4 Seismic design basis for containers CONSTOR® 440/84
Stability of the containers against inversion at seismic loads for design basis earthquake
(SL1 from 0,1 g) and for safe shutdown earthquake (SL2 from 0,2 g) was confirmed.
2.7.2 The main operational measures to maintain DSFS in safe condition after earthquake
DSFS has fire alarm system ensuring local annunciation and the annunciation in the
continuously functioning centre with personnel notifying the site fire fighting service. There is
proper access of the fire vehicles to DSFS and corridor between DSFS and SFS. The main
operational measures will be updated and described in the Final Safety Analysis Report. This will
be a part of the documentation required for issuance of licence of DSFS.
2.7.3 Assessment of indirect effects of the earthquake
The existing facilities of Kozloduy NPP site that may impact on the DSFS after a seismic
event are SFS and AB-2 chimney.
It is concluded that the DSFS site will not have adverse impact from other facilities on
Kozloduy NPP site at an earthquake.
2.7.3.1 Assessment of potential failures to SSCs not seismically qualified that may
compromise safety and robustness of the containers through mechanical interaction
or through internal floodings
This scenario considers the consequences at container blocking with debris that could result
from extreme external initiating events, such as an earthquake, explosion of gas or aircraft crash.
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