WATERING THE NEIGHBOUR'S GARDEN: THE GROWING - CICRED

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C.Z. GUILMOTO – I. ATTANÉ
advantage by establishing the ratio of female-to-male infant mortality at
0.78 for a male probability of dying in the first 5 years of life below
0.05. In China, this advantage had already been lost by 1973-75, with a
ratio of 0.875, and is increasingly waning: 0.948 in 1981, 1.156 in 1990,
and 1.465 in 2000 (Attané, 2004). In India, data are often less reliable
and therefore trends appear less discernible (see however Arokiasamy
in this volume). Sex differentials in child or infant mortality are however
more pronounced in north-western areas and almost absent in the
rest of the country. Excess female infant mortality remains visible at
the national level, with female-to-male ratio above the expected levels:
0.9 in 1992-93 and 1.0 in 1998-99.
The reasons of this excess female infant mortality are wellestablished
and somewhat related to fertility decline, which caused the
expression of son preference to escalate. In China, for instance, as the
family planning policy imposes a prior authorization for each birth, and
inflicts administrative, financial, and occupational penalties on noncompliant
couples, girls become unwanted simply because they deny
their parents the possibility of a son. In both China and India, poor
rural families, in particular, allocate more food to a son than to a
daughter and are more inclined to provide them with costly medical
care. However, the emergence during the last 20 years of sex-selective
abortion has gradually displaced the role of “traditional methods” of
sex selection such as neglect or infanticide.
2.3. Traditional son preference 5
Discrimination against females is a product of Chinese culture.
Traditionally confined to the domestic sphere, a good wife had “to
serve her husband and his parents, to take care of the house and to
have male heirs”. Supported by her family until her marriage, the
daughter was then entirely devoted to her husband’s family. So, a
female birth rarely causes delight, especially for the poorest. Because of
superstition, millions of parents still name their daughters “Laidi”
(literally “A boy is following”), “Pandi” (“Hoping for a son”) or
“Zhaodi” (“Bring us a son”). After marriage, a girl owes nothing to her
parents. She does not have to take care of them when they become old;
that is the duty of a son–and of a daughter-in-law. In the countryside,
people still have to “have a son for old age”, as they will never have
any retirement pension. For hundreds of millions of peasants, a son is
the only guarantee for old age, and against illness or disability.
5 Descriptions of local contexts for son preference in Chinese and Indian settings are
provided in particular in the chapters written in this book by Sekher et al. and by
Bossen.