Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa - PULP - University of ...

160 Chapter 6
encourage countries on the continent to drag their feet in domesticating the
Rome Statute. This is important because, out of 30 states parties from the
continent, only Burkina Faso, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda
have so far passed implementing legislation. Furthermore, other African
state parties may withhold their planned referrals and their planned
ratifications. Improved relations, which can be achieved through an
appreciation of the issues raised here, will in the long run embolden some
countries (for instance Rwanda and Angola) which have vowed never to
become part of the ICC. At the same time, the Court as a legal institution,
whose very essence is to help build an international rule of law, must
jealously guard its mission to ensure that it is not subverted, or perceived
to have been subverted, as an instrument for great powers to target weaker
states or defeat adversaries in less influential regions of the world.
All in all, the controversy sparked by Bashir’s case is a wake-up call. It
ought to be clear that the practice of international criminal law cannot be
conducted devoid of attention to the political environment that informs it.
International criminal law does not operate in a vacuum and, in the case
of Sudan it must function within the larger context of the country’s history.
Sudan has been the venue of one Africa’s longest and bloodiest civil wars.
The present-day Sudanese government is the result of a long period of
international and regional negotiations and mediation between the two
parties. Given the fragility of the transitional arrangements, the issuing of
an arrest warrant for Al Bashir by the ICC is, arguably, badly-timed and
capable of destabilising the already fragile peace processes in place. It may
lead to the increased isolation of the Court by the community of nations.