Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa - PULP - University of ...

22 Chapter 1
amnesties for serious violations of human rights are incompatible with
duties of states under the ICCPR. 70 Such constructions by the Committee
have been described as ‘authoritative’ 71 on the basis that parties to the
Covenant, having agreed to be bound by the treaty obligations contained
therein, are bound to accept, the interpretations rendered by the
Committee. 72
The Inter-American Convention, like the ICCPR, has been interpreted
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 73 and the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights 74 to require state parties to investigate and
punish serious violations of physical integrity rights – such as torture,
extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances. 75 In the Velasquez
Rodriquez case which concerns the unresolved disappearance of Manfredo
Valasquez in September 1981, the Court interpreted article 1(1) of the
Inter-American Convention to impose on state parties a legal duty to ‘…
use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of
violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible,
to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate
69 interpreted the ICCPR to impose a duty to ‘investigate, punish and compensate’ when
disappearance occur. In a case involving disappearances (forced abductions by state
agents followed by denials of knowledge of the victims whereabouts) in Uruguay, the
Committee concluded that the government of Uruguay should take effective steps to
bring to justice any persons found responsible. Quinteros v Uruguay Comm 107/1981,
UN Doc A/38/40 (1983); See also Bleir v Uruguay Comm 107/1981, UN Doc A/38/40
(1983).
70 In 1992 the Committee issued a General Comment asserting that amnesties covering
acts of torture ‘are generally incompatible with the duty of States to investigate such
acts; to guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that
they do not occur in the future’ General Comment 20 (44) (art 7), UN Doc CCPR/
C21/Rev 1/Add 3, para 15 (April 1992).
71 Orentlicher (n 3 above) 2568; Roht-Arriaza (n 21 above) 28-30.
72 Cf B Simma International human rights and general international law: A comparative analysis
(1995) 223.
73 Arts 62 and 64 respectively empower the Court to consider ‘contentious cases’ alleging
a violation of the Convention and to render advisory opinions interpreting the
Convention (as well as other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the
Americas). On the Court see generally, T Buergenthal ‘The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights’ (1982) 76 American Journal of International Law 231.
74 The Commission was created to promote observance of human rights among the
member states of the Organisation of America states (OAS); arts 4 – 6 Declaration at
the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Santiago, Chile, 12-
18 August 1959, Final Act, OAS Official Records, OEA/ser C/II.5, (1959). The
Commission also has powers to examine individual and inter-state communications
alleging human rights violations. See Resolution XXII ‘Expanded Functions of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ Final Act of the Second Special Inter-
American Conference, OAS/serE/XIII 1, 45-46 (1965). For a general discussion on the
Commission see JE Mendez & JM Vivanco ‘Disappearances and the Inter-American
Court: Reflection on a litigation experience’ (1990) 13 Hamline Law Review 507 519-27.
75 See Orentlicher (n 3 above) 2537 (pointing out that the travaux preparatoires of the
American Convention contain little indication that punishment was contemplated as a
necessary means of enforcing the American convention).