Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa - PULP - University of ...

272 Chapter 12
government. 159 In 2006, the LRA and Ugandan government embarked on
peace negotiations, brokered by the Vice-President of the Government of
Southern Sudan (GoSS), Riek Machar. 160 According to the International
Crisis Group (ICG), ‘[t]he Juba process was initially hailed as historic for
good reasons. Started in June 2006, it produced five signed protocols in 21
months, designed to conclude 22 years of conflict and guarantee the
disarmament and reintegration of one of the worst human rights abusing
insurgencies ever’. 161 Between June 2006 and July 2008 the LRA and the
Ugandan government agreed on five main items of the peace process
agenda: 162
(1) Comprehensive solutions to the conflict, including special attention to
the economic recovery of the north, positions for northerners in the
government and a fund to pay reparations to conflict victims;
(2) Accountability and reconciliation, including mechanisms for creation of
a special division of the High Court to try the most serious crimes and
promotion of truth telling and traditional justice mechanisms;
(3) A permanent cessation of hostilities agreement;
(4) Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) principles for
processing and resettling former combatants in Uganda; and
(5) An agreement on implementation and monitoring mechanisms,
requiring the government, after the [Final Peace Agreement] is signed and
during a transitional period in which the LRA is to fully assemble, to ask the
UN Security Council to adopt a resolution deferring all investigation and
prosecution of LRA leaders by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for up
to a year.
The Ugandan government and the LRA later signed the Annexure on
Accountability and Reconciliation which enabled the government to
establish the War Crimes Division (WCD) of the High Court of
Uganda. 163 However, despite assurances about his safety and the need to
conclude the negotiations by signing the final peace agreement, Joseph
Kony did not turn up on 10 April 2008 as earlier anticipated. He cited the
ICC indictment as a reason for his failure to conclude the peace deal. This
apparent drawback notwithstanding, the Ugandan government proceeded
to put into place mechanisms aimed at ensuring that the national judicial
159
International Crisis Group (ICG) ‘Northern Uganda: Seizing the opportunity for
Peace’ Africa Report N°124 – 26 April 2007 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/
africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/124-northern-uganda-seizing-the-opportunity-forpeace.aspx
(accessed 11 August 2010).
160 ICG ‘Peace in Northern Uganda?’ Africa Briefing 13 September 2006 http://
www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/
B041%20Peace%20in%20Northern%20Uganda.ashx (accessed 20 September 2010).
161 ICG ‘Northern Uganda: The road to peace, with or without Kony’ Africa Report 146 –
10 December 2008 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/
uganda/146-northern-uganda-the-road-to-peace-with-or-without-kony.aspx (accessed
11 August 2010).
162 As above.
163
British Broadcasting Corporation ‘Uganda sets up war crimes court’ 26 May 2008
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7420461.stm (accessed 11 August 2010).